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SUPPLY NETWORK FORMATION AND FRAGILITY
MATTHEW ELLIOTT, BENJAMIN GOLUB, AND MATTHEW V. LEDUC
Abstract. We model the production of complex goods in a large supply network. Each firm
sources several essential inputs through relationships with other firms. Due to the risk of such
supply relationships being idiosyncratically disrupted, firms multisource inputs and strategically
invest to make relationships with suppliers stronger. Aggregate production is robust to idiosyncratic
disruptions. However, there is a regime in which equilibrium supply networks are fragile, with
small aggregate shocks to relationships causing arbitrarily steep drops in output. The endogenous
configuration of supply networks provides a new channel for the powerful amplification of shocks.
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11. Introduction
Complex supply networks among firms are a central feature of the modern economy. Consider,
for instance, a product such as an airplane. It consists of multiple parts, each of which is essential for
its production, and many of which are sourced from suppliers. The parts themselves are produced
using multiple inputs, and so on.1 Due to the resulting interdependencies, an idiosyncratic shock
can cause cascading failures and disrupt many firms. We develop a theory in which firms insure
against supply disruptions by strategically investing in their supply networks, trading off the gains
in the robustness of their production against the cost of maintaining good supply relationships.
Our main purpose is to examine the robustness of equilibrium supply networks. We find that (i)
the economy is robust to idiosyncratic risk; yet (ii) small shocks that systematically affect the
functioning of supply relationships are massively amplified; (iii) the functioning of many unrelated
supply chains is highly correlated; and (iv) the complexity of production is key to the level of
aggregate volatility.
Our analysis is built on a model of interfirm sourcing relationships, their disruption by shocks, and
the downstream consequences for production. We now motivate our study of these phenomena with
some examples. Firms rely on particular suppliers to deliver customized inputs. For instance, Rolls-
Royce designed and developed its Trent 900 engine for the Airbus A380; Airbus could not just buy
the engine it requires off-the-shelf. Such inputs are tailored to meet the customer’s specifications,
and there are often only a few potential suppliers that a given firm contracts with. The suppliers
must similarly procure tailored inputs, and so on. Thus, a particular airplane producer is exposed
not just to shocks in the overall availability of each needed input product, but also to idiosyncratic
shocks in the operation of the few particular supply relationships it has formed. Examples of
such idiosyncratic shocks include a delay in shipment, a fire at a factory, a misunderstanding by a
supplier that delivers an unsuitable component, or a strike by workers. Such idiosycratic disruptions
to individual relationships can have far-reaching effects, causing damage that cascades through the
supply chain and affects many downstream firms.2 In Section 6, we discuss evidence that such
disruptions are practically important, and can be very damaging to particular firms.
Our ultimate goal is to understand the robustness of such supply networks. In particular, we want
to study how idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to the functioning of relationships affect aggregate
output and welfare. We first describe how the probability of idiosyncratic disruptions discussed in
the previous paragraph shapes aggregate outcomes. Idiosyncratic realizations—whether a partic-
ular supply chain functions or not—average out.3 What matters is the fraction of supply chains
functioning, which we call the reliability of the supply network. Reliability depends on aggregate
parameters in a way we explicitly characterize. Some of these parameters are features of the supply
network determined by technology and taken to be exogenous—e.g., how many produced inputs a
1For example, an Airbus A380 has millions of parts produced by more than a thousand companies (Slutsken, 2018).
In addition to the physical components involved, many steps of production require specific contracts and relationships
with logistics firms, business services, etc. to function properly.
2Kremer (1993) is a seminal study of some theoretical aspects of such propagation. Carvalho et al. (2016) empirically
study how shocks caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 propagated through supply networks to
locations far from the initial disruption.
3This is by a standard diversification argument. In our model, no firms are systemically important. On the comple-
mentary issue of when individual firms can be systemically important, see Gabaix (2011).
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typical product requires. In contrast, the probability with which any given relationship functions—
which we call relationship strength—is the main endogenous firm decision in our model. Since
production is risky, an optimizing firm will strategically choose its relationship strength to manage
this risk. By investing more, a firm can increase the probability that its potential suppliers are
able to supply it with the inputs it needs, hence allowing the firm to produce its output and make
profits. Airbus, for example, has two engine suppliers for its A380 airplanes. Maintaining multiple
relationships that facilitate production and provide backup in case of disruption is costly. Firms
trade off these costs against the benefits of increased robustness.4
Once we have a model of a supply network with equilibrium investments in relationship strength,
we examine how it responds to shocks that harm many relationships at once. We give several
examples of the kinds of shocks we have in mind. First, suppose that the institutions that help
uphold contracts and facilitate business transactions suddenly decline in quality. Each supply
relationship then becomes more prone to the idiosyncratic disruptions discussed in the previous
paragraph.5 For a second concrete interpretation of the kinds of aggregate shocks we have in mind,
consider a small shock to the availability of credit for businesses in the supply network. The shock
matters for firms that are on the margin between getting and not getting credit that is essential
for them to deliver on a commitment. The effect of such a credit shock can be modeled as any
given supply relationship being slightly less likely to function (depending on ex ante uncertain
realizations of whether a firm is on the relevant margin). Third, for the 2019-20 outbreak of the
novel coronavirus, Covid-19, there is much uncertainty about how different supply relationships
might be affected, and this can be modeled as a systematic decrease in the probability that suppliers
will be able to deliver the inputs required from them.
Our results show, first, that at certain configurations of the aggregate parameters a small shock to
the strength of relationships can decrease the reliability of the supply network from a large, positive
level to 0. There is a precipice where small aggregate shocks to relationship strength unravel
production in many unrelated supply chains simultaneously. The key question is then whether
equilibrium supply networks will be on such a precipice. Our main findings give conditions for this
to occur, and show that the precipice is not a knife-edge outcome. Indeed, we characterize the
open set of parameters (governing the profits of production and the costs of forming relationships)
for which the equilibrium supply network is on the precipice. The fragility that a supply network
experiences in this regime is highly inefficient: a social planner would never put a supply network
on the precipice for the same parameters.
As supply networks become large and decentralized one might think that the impact of uncer-
tainty on the probability of successful production would be smoothed somehow by averaging and
endogenous investment. We find the opposite: in aggregating up the uncertainty through the in-
terdependencies of the supply network, we get a very sharp sensitivity of aggregate productivity to
relationship strength. This is in contrast to many standard production network models, where the
4Strategic responses to risk in networks is a topic that has attracted considerable attention recently. See, for instance,
Bimpikis, Candogan, and Ehsani (2019a), Blume, Easley, Kleinberg, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2011), Talama`s and
Vohra (2018), and Erol and Vohra (2018), and Amelkin and Vohra (2020). On the practical importance of the
strength of contracts in supply relationships, see, among others, Antra`s (2005) and Acemoglu, Antra`s, and Helpman
(2007).
5Indeed, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) present evidence that the former Soviet Union suffered this kind of shock
when it transitioned to a market-based economy; they argue that this contributed to the subsequent drop in output.
3aggregate production function is differentiable at any point. Thus, discrete micro-level disruptions
can lead, in equilibrium, to extreme aggregate fragility.
The novelty of our framework comes from the combination of two features of production functions
that are essential for our results. The first is complexity: In the supply networks we study, firms
must source multiple essential inputs that cannot be purchased off-the-shelf. The second is the
presence of idiosyncratic disruptions to the relationships that mediate this sourcing. Jointly, these
phenomena create the possibility of precipices, which underlie our analysis.
We now outline the details of our model and results more precisely. There are many products.
Each has many differentiated varieties, produced by separate firms that are small relative to the
overall supply network. (Each firm is associated with a single variety.) A given product has a set of
input products that are essential to its production—e.g., an airplane requires engines, navigation
systems, etc. Most varieties of a product have production functions requiring customized inputs—
i.e., they can use only some specific, compatible, varieties of their input products. Thus, in the
above example, the production function of an Airbus A380 can only use a certain number of
engine varieties. These compatibilities determine the potential supply relationships of each firm.
This aspect of the model captures multisourcing—the possibility of relying on any of several,
substitutable, sourcing options.
Each of the potential supply relationships of a firm may operate successfully or not (we will
specify the distribution shortly). The realized supply network consists of the subset of the potential
supply relationships that operate. The realizations of which relationships operate determine which
varieties are functional. In order for a firm’s variety to be functional, the firm must have at least
one operating supply relationship to some firm producing each input product. These must in turn
satisfy the same condition, and so on—until a point in the supply chain where no customized
inputs are required. The firms that are able to produce purchase their required inputs from their
suppliers, hire labor, and then sell their output. Each firm’s output is allocated between use as
an intermediate good and sale at a profit-maximizing markup to consumers. Here our solution is
a standard one—general-equilibrium monopolistic competition. Social welfare is increasing in the
number of varieties produced, because of the household’s love of variety. Firms make gross profits
from production.
Our model of how the realized supply relationships are selected from the potential ones is simple:
independently, each relationship operates successfully with a probability whose determination we
will discuss shortly. The interdependence between firms and their suppliers makes failures corre-
lated between firms that (directly or indirectly) transact with each other. The first set of results
examines aggregate welfare and firm profits when the strength of the relationships is exogenous.
The key parameters for describing the mechanics of a supply network are (i) the number of distinct
inputs required in each production process (a measure of complexity); (ii) the number of potential
suppliers of each input (a measure of the availability of multisourcing); and (iii) the strength of
each relationship. When production is complex (i.e., most firms have multiple essential inputs they
need to source) there is a discontinuity in aggregate productivity: when relationship strength in a
certain supply network falls below a certain threshold (defining the precipice), production in that
network drops discontinuously to zero. This raises the prospect of fragility: a small, correlated,
negative shock to relationship strengths can lead to considerable economic damage. We also show
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that a social planner will always choose costly relationship strengths so that the supply network is
away from a precipice.
A natural question is then whether a supply network will be near a precipice when relationship
strengths are determined by equilibrium choices rather than by a planner. To analyze this, we
model the incentives of firms that are attempting to produce. Firms invest in their relationships.
That is, they choose a level of costly investment toward making relationships stronger—i.e., likelier
to operate.6 Then shocks are realized, and these shocks determine which relationships can actually
operate.
Our main results are on how the sensitivity of production to aggregate shocks depends on an
aggregate productivity multiplier. An increase in this multiplier can be interpreted as an increase
in the productivity of the economy relative to the costs of maintaining relationships. Depending on
the value of this parameter, the supply network in equilibrium can end up in one of three configura-
tions: (i) a noncritical equilibrium where the equilibrium investment is enough to keep relationship
strength away from the precipice; (ii) a critical equilibrium where equilibrium relationship strength
is on the precipice; and (iii) an unproductive equilibrium where positive investment cannot be sus-
tained. These regimes are ordered. As the productivity of the supply network decreases from a
high to a low level, the regimes occur in the order just given. Each regime occurs for a positive
interval of values of the parameter. Equivalently, for an economy consisting of many disjoint supply
networks distributed with full support over the parameter space, a positive measure of them will
be in the fragile regime, and these will collapse if relationship quality is shocked throughout the
economy.
Fragility comes from an interaction between the mechanics of the aggregate production tech-
nology and firms’ investment incentives. The mechanics of production specify how a given level
of relationship strength throughout the supply network translates into equilibrium reliability. The
main feature of the mechanical relationship is the precipice: the steep increase of reliability from
nearly zero to a high level over a very narrow range of relationship strengths. On the incentive
side, for a given level of others’ reliability, firms’ optimization problems determine what relation-
ship strengths they want to choose. To provide sufficient incentives to support a given relationship
strength, we show that reliability must be at a particular intermediate level.7 The precipice pro-
vides a natural place to find an equilibrium: because reliability goes from a low level to a high level
very steeply there, the required intermediate level of reliability often corresponds to a relationship
strength on the precipice.
We then explore some implications of our modeling, especially as it relates to heterogeneity
within and across supply networks. First, we study how fragility manifests in a supply network
with rich heterogeneity across multiple dimensions (number of inputs required, amount of mul-
tisourcing possibilities, directed multisourcing efforts, profitability, etc.). We find that the basic
fragility in production that we identify is not dependent on homogeneity, but it depends critically
6This can be interpreted in two ways: (1) investment on the intensive margin, e.g. to anticipate and counteract risks
or improve contracts; (2) on the extensive margin, to find more partners out of a set of potential ones.
7This is intuitive: When others’ reliability is low there is no point in a firm investing in its own supply relationships
as these suppliers will be unable to produce. When the reliability of others is very high, there is again little point
in a firm investing a great deal in its supply relationships. As all other firms are very reliable, multisourcing means
that a given supply relationship failing is unlikely to matter. The incentives to invest in reliability are highest for
intermediate values of others’ reliability.
5on complexity—the fact that production relies on multiple relationships working. Moreover, a sup-
ply network is only as strong as its weakest links: as one product enters the fragile regime, all
products that depend on it directly or indirectly are simultaneously pushed into the fragile regime.
Second, we show how the supply networks we have studied can be embedded in a larger economy
with intersectoral linkages that come from buying inputs without specific sourcing requirements. It
turns out that even at a macroeconomic scale, the fragilities we have identified are not smoothed
away. Indeed, our model yields a new channel for the propagation of shocks across sectors, and
their stark amplification. When we aggregate up the effects and think of the fragile supply networks
as one part of an interconnected macroeconomy, the forces we identify provide a complementary
perspective on phenomena recently identified in the literature on the amplification of shocks in
a macroeconomics setting (Di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012; Di Giovanni et al., 2018). Third,
while the focus of our analysis is on linking complex supply networks to aggregate volatility, we
also discuss how the model can provide a perspective on some stylized facts concerning industrial
development (see Section 6.1.4). After presenting our results, in Sections 6 and 7 we discuss in
detail how they fit into the most closely related literatures.
2. The model of production
2.1. Products and varieties. There is a finite set I of products. For each product i ∈ I, there
is a continuum Vi of varieties of i, with a typical variety v being an ordered pair v = (i, ω), where
ω ∈ Ωi ⊆ R is a variety index; unless otherwise noted we take Ωi = [0, 1] for all i. Let V =
⋃
i∈I Vi
be the union of all the varieties. The quantity of any variety that is produced is allocated between
consumption and use as an intermediate good.
2.2. The supply network. To specify the production function of a variety, we first define a
supply network that describes production relationships between varieties. First, each product i ∈ I
is associated with a set of required inputs I(i) ⊆ I. Second, each variety v ∈ V is associated with
a supply chain depth d(v) ∈ Z+ that specifies how many steps of customized, specifically sourced
production are required to produce v. The measure of varieties with any depth d ≥ 0 is denoted
by µ(d).
First, consider any variety v ∈ Vi that requires specific sourcing—i.e., has depth d(v) > 0. For
each j ∈ I(i), the variety v has a finite set of potential suppliers, PSj(v) ⊆ Vj , corresponding to the
fact the variety v requires specialized sourcing. The set PSj(v) is a set of distinct varieties v
′ ∈ Vj
with each such v′ having depth d(v′) = d(v) − 1. These are drawn uniformly and independently
from the set of varieties v′ such that d(v′) = d(v)− 1 (i.e., the set of varieties of compatible depth).
Specialized sourcing requirements represent the need for a customized input, the procurement of
which is facilitated by relational contracts. There are thus only finitely many varieties that are
compatible with the production process of v.
Each sourcing relationship between v and a variety v′ ∈ PSj(v) is operational or not—a binary
random outcome. There is a parameter x, called relationship strength (for now exogenous and ho-
mogeneous across the supply network) which is the probability that any relationship is operational.
All these realizations are independent.8 The set of actual suppliers Sj(v) is then obtained by in-
cluding each potential supplier in PSj(v) independently with probability x. Whereas the potential
8For a formal construction of the potential and realized supply networks, see Appendix A.
6 MATTHEW ELLIOTT, BENJAMIN GOLUB, AND MATTHEW V. LEDUC
a1
b1 b2 c2c1
d1 d2 c3 c4 d3 d4 c5 c6 a5a4e4e3a3a2e2e1
Figure 1. Here we consider a potential supply network for variety (a, 1) with underlying products
I = {a, b, c, d, e}; the relevant input requirements are apparent from the illustration. Each variety
requires two distinct input products. When these inputs must be specifically sourced, there is an
edge from the sourcing variety to its potential supplier. We abbreviate (a, 1) as a1 (and similarly
for other varieties). Here variety a1 has depth d(a1) = 2. Varieties higher up are upstream of a1.
(Thus, orders or sourcing attempts go in the direction of the arrows, and products are delivered in
the opposite direction, downstream.)
supply relationships define compatibilities, the realized supply network identifies which links are
actually available for sourcing. The stochastic nature of availability arises, e.g., from uncertainty
in delivery of orders, miscommunications about specifications, etc.9
We define two random networks on the set V of nodes. In the potential supply network G,
each v has links directed to all its potential suppliers v′ ∈ ⋃j∈I(i) PSj(v). (See Figure 1 for an
illustration.) In the realized supply network G, each v has links directed to all its (operational)
suppliers v′ ∈ ⋃j∈I(i) Sj(v). See the links in Figure 2 for an illustration of the subset of supply
relationships that remain operational.
It remains to consider varieties of depth 0—the v ∈ V such that d(v) = 0. These do not require
specialized sourcing and can use any variety. Thus we take Sj(v) = Vj for such a variety for any
j ∈ I(i).
2.3. Production. We use a canonical monopolistic competition model to determine production
and surplus on a given realized supply network.10
2.3.1. Intermediate and final versions of each variety. The output of any variety v ∈ Vi can be
used in one of two ways. First it can be transformed into an intermediate good version, which
is usable only those varieties v′ such that v ∈ PSi(v′)—i.e., the ones compatible with it. This
can be interpreted as a costless transformation made possible by the supply relationship with v′
that makes v suitable for use by v′. Alternatively, v can be converted costlessly into a different,
consumption good version, denoted v. (As we will discuss later, this transformation technology is
owned by a particular firm, which earns rents from selling differentiated consumption goods.)
2.3.2. Quantities and production functions. Suppose v procures for its production zv,v′ units of the
variety v′ ∈ Sj(v). For a given required input j ∈ I(i), let zv,j be the total amount of j sourced
by v, summing across all of v’s suppliers for this input,11 and write zv for the vector of all these
9In a bit more detail, x can capture uncertainty regarding compatibility, whether delivery can happen on time,
possible misunderstanding about the required input, access to credit that may be needed to deal with unexpected
costs, etc. It will depend on the context or environment in which production occurs, and also (as we explicitly model
below) on the investments agents make. See Section 6 for more details.
10Our goal is to keep this part of the model standard, in order to put the focus on the structure of the underlying
supply network.
11We only consider allocations where only finitely many of the zv,v′ are positive.
7quantities associated with variety v. Let `v be the amount of labor used by variety v. Then the
output of v is
yv = f(`v, zv) := (`v)
ε`
∏
j∈I(i)
(zv,j)
εz , (1)
where ε` + |I(i)|εz = 1 so that there are constant returns to scale. Thus, all varieties in any set
Sj(v) are perfect substitutes. But some of each variety, as well as labor, is needed to produce any
output of variety v.12 The only factor (i.e., unproduced good) in the economy is labor, of which
there is an inelastic supply of ` = 1 unit.
Let qv be the quantity of v consumed, and let the household’s consumption be
C = κ
(∫
V
(qv)
ηCdv
)1/ηC
, (2)
a demand aggregator with 12 < ηC < 1.
13 Household utility is equal to C. The parameter κ > 0 is
a productivity multiplier.
3. Equilibrium production with exogenous relationship strengths
3.1. The mass of functional varieties. Given a realized supply network, it is clear that not all
varieties can be produced: for example, consider a variety v with depth d(v) > 0 that happens to
have no (operational) suppliers. Such a variety will have a production function equal to the zero
function. We call a variety functional if there is some profile of quantities procured, (zv,v′)v,v′∈V ,
consistent with the supply network14 such that yv > 0.
In this section, we describe which varieties are functional and analyze the size of this set. Because
the consumer preferences feature love of variety, the economy is more productive when more varieties
are functional. This motivates our analysis of which varieties can be produced, given the realized
supply network, and what the size of this set is. We show after this that welfare (i.e., total
consumption) is indeed monotonically increasing in the number of functional varieties.
For a given realization of the supply network, we will determine which varieties are functional.
This can be determined inductively. First, consider the functionality of the depth-0 varieties. As
they require no specific sourcing, they will always be functional. Given functionalities of varieties
of depth d− 1, a variety v of depth d is functional if and only if its set of realized suppliers Sj(v)
is nonempty for each input j that v requires. Figure 2 provides an illustration for the potential
supply network shown in Figure 1 and a given realization of operational supply links.
We now study reliability for regular supply networks where the number of essential inputs is
|I(i)| = m for each product i and each variety of depth d > 0 has n potential suppliers for each
12The elasticity of substitution is 1 between any two inputs. Boehm, Flaaen, and Pandalai-Nayar (2019) estimate,
in the context of a supply network disruption event, a production function with much lower elasticity of substitution,
closer to Leontief (zero elasticity of substiutution). For our study of disruptions, assuming a higher elasticity of
substitution is conservative: we assume more substitution possibilities between varieties than there seem to be in
times of disruption.
13The same results would hold if we defined a suitable nested-CES aggregator, with categories of products of equal
measures being the nests. The upper bound on ηC ensures that the elasticity of substitution between varieties is
less than 1 (so that variety is sufficiently valuable), while the lower bound ensures that the equilibrium returns to
increasing variety are concave, which is technically convenient; see the discussion after Definition 1.
14I.e., for variety v = (i, ω) the quantity zv,v′ can be positive only if v
′ ∈ ⋃j∈I(i) Sj(v), i.e., only if v′ is a realized
supplier of v.
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a1
b1 b2 c2c1
d1 d2 c3 c4 d3 d4 c5 c6 a5a4e4e3a3a2e2e1
(A) Step 1: Assigning functionalities for depth-1 varieties.
b1 c2b2
a1
c1
d1 d2 c3 c4 d3 d4 c5 c6 a5a4e4e3a3a2e2e1
(B) Step 2: Assigning functionalities of depth-2 varieties.
Figure 2. An illustration for determining the set of functional varieties given a realized supply
network. Functional varieties are represented by green circles, while non-functional ones are white
squares. Varieties that have not yet been assigned to be functional or not are white circles. Varieties
of depth 0 are always functional. Panel (A) assigns functionalities to varieties of depth 1. Panel
(B) assigns functionalities to varieties of depth 2.
input—i.e. |PSj(v)| = n whenever j is one of the required inputs for variety v. We relax this
assumption in Section 6.3.5.
Denote by ρ˜(x, d) the probability that a variety of depth d is functional when relationship strength
is x. By symmetry of the supply tree, this probability does indeed only depend on x and d. The
main outcome we will focus on is the probability that a variety selected uniformly at random is
functional, which we call the reliability of the supply network. We denote this by ρ(x, µ) and define
it as
ρ(x, µ) =
∞∑
d=0
µ(d)ρ˜(x, d),
recalling that µ is the distribution of depths (a probability measure on the nonnegative integers).
3.1.1. Deep supply networks: Taking limits. A focus throughout will be the case where a typical
variety has large depth.15 To this end, we fix a sequence (µτ )
∞
τ=1 of distributions, where µτ places
mass at least 1− 1τ on [τ,∞).16 For instance, we can take µτ to be the geometric distribution with
mean τ . For τ large, if inputs are single-sourced (n = 1) and links fail with positive probability,
there will only be a very remote probability of successful production. We therefore restrict attention
to the case of multisourcing (n ≥ 2).
15Supplementary Appendix SA1 investigates how reliability varies with investment in production trees with limited
depth.
16Note that this means varieties of low depth have many incoming edges in the potential supply network, since there
are relatively few of them, but they make up a relatively large number of the nodes in a typical production tree.
93.2. Production equilibrium. Continuing with a fixed x, we study the structure of competitive
equilibrium on a realized supply network.
A competitive equilibrium is a tuple, satisfying certain conditions, consisting of the following:
• prices: a price pv for each intermediate variety v ∈ V; a price pv for the corresponding
consumption good; and a wage w.
• quantities: zv,v′ for each link in the realized supply network, as well as qv for each consump-
tion good v ∈ V.
The equilibrium conditions are that all markets clear; that production of each variety v ∈ V
maximizes profits given prices; that prices pv of consumer goods are set to maximize profits given
all other prices; and that the consumer maximizes her utility (by spending all labor income on
consumption).
3.2.1. Analysis of the production equilibrium. We briefly describe the structure of equilibrium,
deferring the full reasoning behind these assertions to Appendix B.
First, in equilibrium: (i) each functional variety v has the same consumer good output qv, which
we call q; (ii) these goods are all priced at some price p; (iii) all intermediate goods of variety v ∈ V
have the same price pv = p. These facts follow from the symmetry of the production technology
across firms and the concavity of the household’s utility.
Because of the love of variety that households have, the profit maximizing price that firms set for
their consumer goods is at a markup over marginal cost. On the other hand, constant returns to
scale in the production function means that intermediate goods that can be produced (i.e., which
are able to source all of their required inputs) must be priced at marginal cost in equilibrium. All
firms face the same problem for the production of their consumer goods. As a result they choose to
produce the same quantity at the same marginal cost, and set the same price for it. As all profits
are made on the sales of consumer goods, functional firms make symmetric profits in equilibrium
which helps align their incentives to invest in reliability.
There are two other key features of the equilibrium:
Lemma 1.
(1) The household’s consumption is equal to κh(ρ(x, µ)), where h : [0, 1]→ R+ is an increasing
and continuous function with bounded derivative and h(0) = 0.
(2) The expected gross profit of producing each variety, conditional on that variety being func-
tional, is equal to κg(ρ(x, µ)); where g : [0, 1]→ R+ is a decreasing function.
The result on the household’s utility is driven by love of variety: consumers are better off when
the same scarce factor (labor) can be used to produce more varieties.17 The result on gross profits
is more subtle.
3.2.2. Comments on the setup. As in standard monopolistic competition models, a firm commits
to a single price p for its consumption good v before producing. These goods are sold at a markup
above marginal cost; the quantity is determined by consumer demand at that price. Though a firm
17Though a larger number of functional varieties requires labor to be shared out among more varieties at once,
constant returns to scale of production means that there is no loss or increase in productivity due to this.
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Figure 3. Panel (A) shows how reliability varies with relationship strength x for a particular τ .
Panel (B) depicts a correspondence that is the limit of the graphs ρ(x, τ) as τ tends to infinity.
would like to sell more at that price, the renegotiation in which the firm cuts the price for some
consumers is unavailable: the firm posts a single price to maximize its profits.18
Concerning intermediate goods, the general equilibrium approach similarly posits that the in-
termediate of variety v has a single price irrespective of who buys it. Paralleling the discussion
above, this forecloses some bargaining possibilities. One could imagine that some firms would be
willing to pay a higher price for v than others because, in a given supply network realization, they
have no alternative functional suppliers from whom they might acquire a needed input. General
equilibrium pricing rules out hold-up of this sort. Our rationale is that relational contracts exists
precisely to foreclose this kind of hold-up: a firm that attempts to extract more can be punished
in future periods by its counterparties’ forming relationships with different suppliers.19
3.3. The aggregate production function: A discontinuity in reliability. A key implication
of the model is the shape of the aggregate production function in equilibrium as we vary x. This
shape underlies many of our results. Let C∗(x, µτ ) denote household utility in equilibrium when
the distribution of depths is µτ and relationship strength is x. Our first result is:
Proposition 1. Fix any n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2. Then there exist positive numbers xcrit, rcrit > 0 such
that, for all large enough τ ,
(i) if x < xcrit, we have that ρ(x, µτ ) → 0 and C∗(x, µτ ) → 0 as τ → ∞. That is, both
reliability and consumption converge to 0.
(ii) if x > xcrit, then, for all large enough τ , we have ρ(x, µτ ) > rcrit and C
∗(x, µτ ) ≥ C > 0,
where C does not depend on x or τ . That is, both reliability and consumption remain
bounded away from 0.
18As there are constant returns to scale, the amount of intermediate goods produced has no bearing on production
costs for the final goods, and vice versa.
19Indeed, one of the main advantages of close supply relationships is that they help firms commit to efficient prices
and avoid holdup when a firm has temporary market power over another (Uzzi, 1997; Kirman and Vriend, 2000).
This can be further microfounded in models of the determination of a relational-contract price, but we stick with a
simple general-equilibrium description here.
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Figure 4. The probability, Rx(r), that a focal firm is functional as a function of r, the prob-
ability that a random supplier is functional. Here we use the parameters n = 3, m = 4 and
x ∈ {0.75, 0.775, 0.8, 0.85}. The intersections with the 45 degree line marked by the red circles
represent equilibrium reliability.
In Figure 3(a) we plot the reliability function ρ(x, µτ ) for a fixed finite value of τ against the
probability x of each relationship being operational. One can see a sharp transition in relationship
strength x at a value that we call xcrit. This can be seen more sharply in Figure 3(b), where we
plot the limit of the graph shown in (a) as τ → ∞. We use the m = n = 2 case here as in our
illustrations above. The probability of successful production is 0 when x < xcrit, but then increases
sharply to more than 70% for all x > xcrit. Moreover, the derivative of the limit reliability graph as
we approach xcrit from above grows large (i.e., limx↓xcrit limτ→∞ ρ
′(x, µτ ) =∞). This has important
ramifications, as we will see.
3.3.1. The reasons for the shape of the reliability function. To explain the logic behind the propo-
sition, let us now calculate the probability that a given variety v with depth d is functional.
Recall that we denote by ρ˜(x, d) the probability that a variety of depth d is functional when re-
lationship strength is x. We will argue that this can be expressed recursively as follows. First,
ρ˜(x, 0) = 1, since varieties of depth 0 are sure to be functional. Then, for a suitably defined
function Rx : [0, 1] → [0, 1], we can write the depth-d reliability in terms of the depth-(d − 1)
reliability:
ρ˜(x, d) = Rx(ρ˜(x; d− 1)). (3)
Indeed, more explicitly, the function that makes this true is20
Rx(r) = (1− (1− xr)n)m.
Proposition 5 in Appendix C.1 shows that there is a unique correspondence ρ(x) that is the limit
of the graphs of ρ(·, µτ ) in a suitable sense as τ →∞, and that a sharp transition like that shown
in Figure 3(b) holds for any complexity m ≥ 2 and any multisourcing level n ≥ 2.
20Consider the first input of a focal variety. For a given supplier of that input, by definition its reliability is the
argument r, and the probability that the link to the supplier is operational is x. The probability that both events
happen is xr. The probability that this combination of events happens for at least one of the n potential suppliers
of the first input is therefore 1 − (1 − xr)n. Finally, the probability that for all m such a “good event” happens is
(1− (1− xrs)n)m.
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The intuition for the sharp transition can be understood by looking at Figure 4. Here we plot the
probability that a given firm is functional against the probability that its suppliers are functional.
As supply networks become deep, consistency requires these numbers to be equal (since a firm
and its suppliers occupy essentially equivalent positions) and the reliability levels satisfying the
fixed point condition in equation (3) are given by intersections with the 45-degree line. For high
enough x, the graph of Rx intersects the 45-degree line above 0. Repeatedly applying formula (3)
starting with ρ˜(x, 0) = 1 yields a sequence of ρ˜(x, d) converging to the largest such intersection.
The reliability associated with that intersection is bounded away from 0. When x is below a certain
critical value, the graph of Rx has no nontrivial intersection with the 45-degree line and so ρ˜(x, d)
converges to 0. As we explain in Section 6.1.4 where we contrast complex production (m > 1)
with simple production (m = 1), the convex-then-concave shape of the R curve is essential to the
precipice in the complex case.
3.3.2. Comparative statics of the reliability function. Some straightforward comparative statics can
be deduced from what we have said. If n (multisourcing) increases while all other parameters are
held fixed, then one can check that Rx increases pointwise on (0, 1), and this implies that all the
ρ˜(x, d) increase. It follows that the ρ curve moves upward, and the discontinuity occurs at a lower
value of x.
Similarly, when m (complexity) increases, the Rx curve decreases pointwise, implying that all
the ρ˜(x, d) decrease. It follows that the ρ curve moves downward, and the discontinuity occurs at
a higher value of x.
4. Supply networks with endogenous relationship strength
In this section, we study the endogenous determination of relationship strength. We first study
a planner’s problem—setting efficient relationship strengths—and then turn to a decentralized
problem. Throughout, we focus on symmetric outcomes.
The results show that while investments that put the economy on the precipice are very inefficient,
they need not be knife-edge or even unlikely outcomes in equilibrium.
4.1. A planner’s problem. We first consider a planner who chooses a value of x to which all
relationship strengths xif are set. This can be thought of as choosing the quality of institutions.
The planner’s problem is
max
x∈[0,1]
C(x, µ)− c(x). (4)
Here C(x, µ) is equilibrium consumption21 given relationship strengths x and depth distribution
µ, while c is a convex function representing the cost of maintaining institutions of quality x, paid
in units of output. We assume that c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, and limx→1 c′(x) = ∞. Recall that κ,
which we assume is positive, is a total-factor productivity multiplier in equation (1). The planner
seeks to maximize expected social surplus, which is the total surplus produced by the firms that
are functional minus the cost of maintaining institutions.
21This is the same as household utility. We omit the asterisk for equilibrium, since we will work with an equilibrium
of the production economy from now on.
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Define the correspondence
xSP (κ, µ) := argmax
x∈[0,1]
C(x, µ)− c(x)
This gives the values of x that solve the social planner’s problem for a given productivity κ and
distribution of supply chain lengths µ. As elsewhere, we consider a sequence (µτ )
∞
τ=1 of distributions,
where µτ places mass at least 1− 1τ on [τ,∞).
Proposition 2. Fix any n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2. Then for all τ sufficiently large there exists a
κcrit(µτ ) > 0 such that
(i) for all κ < κcrit(µτ ), x
SP (κ, µτ ) = 0.
(ii) for all κ > κcrit(µτ ), all values of x
SP (κ, µτ ) are strictly greater than xcrit.
(iii) for κ = κcrit(µτ ), all values of x
SP (κ, µτ ) are either strictly greater than xcrit or else equal
to 0.
The first part of Proposition 2 says that when κ is sufficiently low, it is too costly for the social
planner to invest anything in the quality of institutions. As κ increases, a threshold κcrit is reached
and at this value of κ it first becomes optimal to invest in institutional quality. At this threshold,
the social planner’s investment increases discontinuously. Moreover, it immediately increases to a
level strictly above xcrit, and for all larger κ all solutions stay above xcrit.
It is worth emphasizing that the planner never chooses to invest at the critical level xcrit. The
reason is as follows: at this value of x the marginal social benefits of investing are infinite in the
limit as τ gets large while marginal costs at xcrit are bounded, and so the social planner can always
do better by increasing investment at least a little. In contrast, in Section 5 we will see that
individual investment choices can put the supply network on the precipice in equilibrium, and this
is not a knife-edge scenario.
The shape of the reliability function has some other implications worth remarking on. As rela-
tionship strength increases, a threshold is passed at which production becomes possible. Moreover,
reliability (the probability of successfully producing the good) jumps abruptly from 0 to a positive
number (in the n = m = 2 case, approximately 0.8) as x improves around the threshold xcrit. This
implies that small improvements in relationship strength x, for example through the improvement
of institutions, can have large payoffs for an economy, and the net marginal returns on investment
in x can change sharply from being negative to being positive and very large.
4.2. Decentralized investment in relationship strengths.
4.2.1. Setup and timing. Now we formulate a simple, symmetric, model of decentralized choices of
relationship strengths. The decision-makers in this richer model are firms. In each product i, there
is a continuum of separate firms (i, f), where f ∈ Ωi (the same as the index set of the varieties),
which is typically [0, 1]. We often abbreviate a firm by if .
Firms simultaneously choose investment levels yif ≥ 0. Choosing a level yif has a private cost
c(yif ). The firm (i, f) owns a variety v = (i, f). The random realizations of the supply network
occur after the firm chooses its investment level. Substantively, this means that a firm’s investments
occur before the realization of the randomness that governs operation of relationships in a particular
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time period.22 If a firm chooses an investment level yif , then all sourcing links from its variety
(i, f) have relationship strength
xif = x+ yif .
The intercept x ≥ 0 is a baseline probability of relationship operation that occurs absent any costly
investment. This can be interpreted as a measure of the quality of institution—e.g., how likely
a “basic contract” is to deliver.23 The main purpose of this baseline level is as a simple channel
to shock relationship strength.24 We will typically think of firms directly choosing the strength of
their relationships, xif ∈ [x, 1], and paying the corresponding investment cost c(xif − x).
The timing is as follows.
1. Firms simultaneously choose their investment levels.
2. The realized supply network is drawn, a competitive equilibrium allocation is implemented,
and payoffs are enjoyed.25
An outcome is given by relationship strengths xif for all firms if .
We make the following assumptions:26
Assumption 1.
(i) x < xcrit;
(ii) c′ is increasing and weakly convex, with c(0) = 0;
(iii) the Inada conditions hold: limy↓0 c′(y) = 0 and limy↑1−x c′(y) =∞.
The first part of this assumption ensures that baseline (free) relationship strength is not so high
that the supply network is guaranteed to be productive even without any investment. The second
assumption imposes assumptions on investment costs that help guarantee agents’ optimization
problems are well-behaved. The Inada conditions, as usual, will be important in making investments
interior.
4.2.2. Payoffs and equilibrium. We now turn to a firm’s payoffs, which—given our focus on sym-
metric outcomes—we must specify only for symmetric behavior of other firms. Let P (xif ;x, µ) be
the probability with which a firm if is functional if firm if ’s investment choice is xif and all other
firms choose a symmetric investment level x.27 By Lemma 1 in Section 3, conditional on being
functional and all other firms having a reliability r, a firm earns a gross profit from sales of final
goods equal to κg(r); where g : [0, 1]→ R+ is a decreasing function. Thus, the net expected profit
of firm if when it makes its investment decision is
Πif = P (xif ;x, µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. functional
κg(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gross profit
− c(xif − x).︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of investment
(5)
22This assumption is technically convenient, as it keeps the solution of the model symmetric. Substantively, it
captures uncertainty about the depth of the supply chain of a firm’s variety. The firm knows that after some number
of stages of production, disruption-prone contracts will not be needed by its indirect suppliers (e.g., because these
suppliers are able to use generic inputs or rely on inventories). However, the firm does not know how many steps this
will take.
23This might depend, for instance, on the quality of the commercial courts.
24Other specifications, such as a multiplicative one, could be used.
25Our results in Section 3 imply that payoffs at this stage are uniquely determined.
26Recall Proposition 1. See also Proposition 5 in Appendix C.1 for more details on this value.
27We identify a firm with its variety, and thus speak of a firm being functional or not, etc.
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If a firm does not enter, its net profit is 0.
5. Equilibrium supply networks and their fragility
We now study the equilibrium of our model: its productivity and its robustness. This section
builds up to a main result: Theorem 1. We show that in the limit as production networks become
deep, there are three regimes. First, for low values of the productivity multiplier κ there is an
unproductive regime in which positive investment cannot be sustained. Next, for intermediate
values of κ there is a critical regime in which equilibrium investment is xcrit and arbitrarily small
shocks to relationship strength lead to discontinuous drops in production. Finally, there is a
noncritical regime in which equilibrium investment is above xcrit and the economy is robust to
small shocks.
It is worth writing (5) more explicitly. To do this, we calculate P (xif ;x, µ), the probability with
which if is able to produce, as a function of firm if ’s investment choice xif given that all other
firms choose a symmetric investment level x:28
P (xif ;x, µ) := µ(0) + E [1− (1− xif ρ˜(x, d− 1))n]m ,
where d inside the expectation is drawn from the depth distribution µ conditional on depth being
at least 1. Recall from equation (3) in Section 3.3.1 the formulas for ρ˜.
Definition 1. We say x ≥ x is a symmetric equilibrium if xif = x maximizes Πif (xif ;x, µ) for any
firm if . It is a symmetric undominated equilibrium if it is the symmetric equilibrium maximizing
the social surplus of production net of investment.29
When we refer to an equilibrium in the sequel, we mean a symmetric undominated equilibrium
unless otherwise noted. Note that a symmetric equilibrium is defined by the level of relationship
strength x = x+ y realized in it, rather than the level of investment y. This turns out to be more
convenient.
Our equilibrium definition requires that all firms’ investment choices are equal and are mutual
best responses to each other. Lemma 5 in the appendix shows that the efficiency condition selects
the symmetric equilibrium associated with the highest investment level, and hence highest reliabil-
ity.30 Note that it is always a best response for a firm to choose zero investment when all others
choose zero investment. Our equilibrium definition abstracts from potential miscoordination on
the zero investment level, or other inefficient ones, by selecting symmetric mutual best responses
maximizing output whenever possible.
In the limit, as the expected depth of the supply networks becomes large, if firms symmetrically
choose investments yif = 0 then the reliability is ρ(x) = 0 as x < xcrit (by Assumption 1). Hence,
for large enough τ , xif = x maximizes Πif (xif ;x, µτ ) and so there exists an equilibrium.
28Note that because there is a continuum of firms the probability that a firm appears in its potential supply network
upstream of itself is 0. Thus the reliability of if ’s suppliers does not depend on xif .
29This is C(x, µ) − c(x). The latter term is the total cost of investments. We posit that firms in product i have
measure 1/|I| (i.e. that the measure on the set Fi is the Lebesgue measure times |I|−1) in order to make the constant
multiplying c(x) equal to 1.
30This is the place where we use the assumption that ηC >
1
2
, which is technically convenient for this argument,
though stronger than necessary.
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In analyzing the symmetric equilibria it is helpful to make an assumption on the environment
that ensures that local optimality with respect to an investment choice implies global optimality.
Assumption 2. For any x > xcrit the function Πif (xif ;x, µτ ) has a unique interior local maximum
for all large enough τ .31
Assumptions 1–2 will be maintained in the sequel. The following lemma allows us to formulate
a condition on primitives that is sufficient for Assumption 2 to hold.
Lemma 2. For any m ≥ 2, and any n ≥ 2, there is a number32 x̂, depending only on m and n, such
that, for large enough τ we have: (i) x̂ < xcrit; and (ii) if x ≥ x̂, then Assumption 2 is satisfied.
Consider any environment where x ∈ [x̂, xcrit). Part (i) of the lemma guarantees that the interval
[x̂, xcrit) is nonempty, and part (ii) guarantees that Assumption 2 is satisfied for values of x in this
range.33
We now characterize the equilibrium behavior.34
Theorem 1. Fix any n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3. There are thresholds κ, κ, which depend on n, m only,
such that the following holds. For τ exceeding some threshold τ , there is a unique symmetric
undominated equilibrium with investment levels x∗τ (κ). Moreover, for any ε > 0, the threshold τ
can be chosen so that the equilibrium satisfies the following properties:
(i) If κ < κ, there is no investment: x∗τ (κ) = 0
(ii) For κ ∈ [κ, κ], the equilibrium investment level satisfies x∗τ (κ) ∈ [xcrit− ε, xcrit + ε]. We call
such equilibria critical.
(iii) For κ > κ, the equilibrium investment level satisfies x∗τ (κ) > xcrit+ε. We call such equilibria
non-critical.
Moreover, for τ ≥ τ , the function x∗τ (κ) is increasing on the domain κ > κ.
If we think about different supply networks being parameterized by different values of κ in a
compact set, Theorem 1 implies that in the limit as τ gets large, there will be a positive fraction
of supply networks in which firms will choose investments converging to xcrit in equilibrium. This
contrasts with the social planner’s solution, which never selects such investments x = xcrit. It also
means that a positive faction of supply networks end up perched on the precipice, vulnerable to
shocks.
Figure 5 helps give some intuition for Theorem 1. In any symmetric equilibrium, the reliability
of each firm must be consistent with the symmetric investment level chosen by the firms—we must
be somewhere on the reliability curve we derived in Section 2. The thick, green graphs in panels
(A)–(D) of Figure 5 illustrate the shape of the reliability curve for large τ . Further, in any sym-
metric equilibrium each firm’s symmetric investment choice of x must be a best response given the
reliability of its suppliers. The thin red curves in panels (A)–(D) depict the best-response function;
these curves should be thought of as having their independent variable (others’ reliability) on the
31The assumption permits another local maximum at a corner. We rule this out separately.
32In the proof, we give an explicit description of x̂ in terms of the shape of the function P (xif ;x, µτ ).
33While conditions we identify in Lemma 2 are sufficient for satisfying Assumption 2 they are not necessary.
34Throughout this section, we restrict attention to the case of m ≥ 3. It is essential for our results that supply
networks are complex and m ≥ 2, but the case of m = 2 generates some technical difficulties for our proof technique
so we consider m ≥ 3. In numerical exercises, our conclusions seem to also hold for m = 2.
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Figure 5. Panel (A) shows an equilibrium for κ < κ. Panel (B) shows an equilibrium with κ = κ.
Panel (C) shows an equilibrium with κ = κ. Panel (D) shows an equilibrium with κ > κ. Panel (E)
plots how equilibrium reliability varies with κ. Panel (F) shows reliability following an arbitrarily
small negative shock to institutional quality x as κ varies.
vertical axis, and the best-response investment on the horizontal axis. The panels show the best-
response curves for increasing values of κ. Intersections of these two curves are potential symmetric
equilibria. Our equilibrium definition implies that when there are multiple intersections we select
the one associated with the highest reliability. Thus equilibrium reliability is 0 for κ sufficiently
small, jumps up discontinuously to rcrit at κ, and is increasing in κ thereafter. This is shown in
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Panel (E). Note that although reliability increases as κ ranges over the interval [κ, κ], because the
limit reliability curve is a correspondence with ρ(xcrit) = [0, rcrit], equilibrium investment for large τ
remains arbitrarily close to xcrit. In other words, equilibrium investment choices bunch around xcrit
for an open interval of values of κ. For all κ ∈ [κ, κ] a slight shock causing relationship strengths
to diminish from x to x−  causes relationship strengths to fall below xcrit, and makes equilibrium
production collapse. Panel (F) shows reliability after such a shock for different values of κ. As can
be seen by comparing panels (E) and (F), there is virtually no difference in reliability for either
κ < κ or κ > κ. However, for κ ∈ [κ, κ] reliability drops discontinuously to 0.
The key to proving Theorem 1 is showing that, as depicted in Figure 5, the highest intersection
between the two curves moves downward while it is well-defined. This is not straightforward. In-
vestment incentives (which determine the shape of the best-response curve) are complex, and so
equilibrium investment is difficult to characterize directly. One reason for this is a non-monotonicity:
investments in relationship strength are strategic complements in some regions of the parameter
space, and strategic substitutes in others.35 Thus, there are no straightforward monotone com-
parative statics. The problem is made more challenging by the fact that we do not have explicit
expressions either for the reliability curve or the best-response curve. We establish the key prop-
erty by combining a first-order condition characterizing best-response investment with the reliability
condition, and showing that there can be at most one solution to both for r ≥ rcrit.36 Once we
have uniqueness, the comparative statics follow by analyzing how the best-response curve (which
we show slopes strictly downward at the point of intersection) shifts inward as we decrease κ.
Our next result, Corollary 1, implies that the comparative statics of equilibrium as the baseline
quality of institutions x changes are analogous to those documented with respect to κ in Theorem
1. Here we explicitly include x as an argument in x∗.
Corollary 1. Suppose κ′ > κ. Then, for large enough τ , if x∗τ (κ′, x) > x∗τ (κ, x), there is an x′ > x
such that x∗τ (κ′, x) = x∗τ (κ, x′).
5.1. Fragility. Critical equilibria are important because, as the example in Figure 5 shows, they
create the possibility of fragility: small shocks to relationship strengths via a reduction in x can
result in a collapse of production. We formalize this idea by explicitly examining how the supply
network responds to a shock to the baseline quality of institutions x, which for simplicity are taken
to have zero probability (though the analysis is robust to anticipated shocks that happen with
sufficiently small probability).
Definition 2 (Equilibrium fragility).
• There is equilibrium fragility at κ if for any η,  > 0, for large enough τ , we have
ρ(x∗τ (κ)− ) < η.
35When a firm’s suppliers are very unreliable, there is little incentive to invest in stronger relationships with them—
there is no point in having a working supply relationship when the suppliers cannot produce their goods. On the
other hand, when a firm’s suppliers are extremely reliable, a firm can free-ride on this reliability and invest relatively
little in its relationships, knowing that as long as it has one working relationship for each input it requires, it is very
likely to be able to source that input.
36This comes down, after a lot of massaging, to showing that there is only one root of a certain function that we can
write explicitly. This function being zero is a necessary condition for an equilibrium.
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That is, a shock that reduces relationship strengths arbitrarily little () from their equilib-
rium levels leads to a drop to reliability very close to 0 (within η).
• We say there is equilibrium robustness at κ if there is not equilibrium fragility.
In the definition of fragility, while shocking x, we hold investment decisions and entry choices
fixed. Implicitly, we are assuming that investments in supply relationships and entry decisions
are made over a sufficiently long time frame that firms cannot change the quality of their supply
relationships or their entry decisions in response to a shock.
Proposition 3. There is equilibrium fragility at any κ ∈ [κ, κ] and equilibrium robustness at any
κ > κ.
Proposition 3 follows immediately from the definition of equilibrium fragility and our previous
characterization.
There are many ways in which the small common shock discussed in this section might arise in
practice. Recall the example in the introduction. A small shock to credit markets makes many
supply relationships slightly more likely to fail—in the states of the world where they happen to
require short-term financing to deal with a disruption. Another, similar, example is uncertainty
about which relationships will be affected by possible compliance issues related to new trade regula-
tions, thereby making supply relationships more prone to disruption. For a third example, consider
an increasing backlog in commercial courts—a circumstance that makes contracts more costly to
enforce. This again decreases the probability that contracts function in some states of the world—
an uncertainty that can affect many players in the supply chain. For a final example, suppose there
is a new pandemic outbreak of a disease. This will likely affect some supply relationships, but not
others; uncertainty around this can be captured by a small reduction in the probability that a given
supply relationship is disrupted.
6. Discussion of the model
This section discusses our modeling choices. First, we discuss which features of our environment
are essential, and explain the empirical facts motivating them. Next, we present evidence from
the existing literature congruent with the short-run and medium-run predictions of our model
concerning the effect of shocks. Beyond the key assumptions, we make a variety of assumptions
for tractability or simplicity. At the end of the section, we discuss the robustness of our model to
various relaxations of these non-essential assumptions.
6.1. Essential features. The key features of our model are that (i) a typical firm uses failure-prone
relationships with particular suppliers to source inputs; (ii) the investment in these relationships is
voluntary and decentralized, due in part to the incompleteness of contracts; and (iii) production is
complex—a typical firm’s production relies on multiple such non-commodity inputs. In this section
we discuss some motivations and interpretations of these crucial assumptions. We also show that
without any one of them, our main results on equilibrium fragility would not obtain.
6.1.1. Relationship-based sourcing and idiosyncratic disruptions. As we have discussed in the in-
troduction, specific sourcing relationships are a central feature of the modern economy. Supplier
relationships have been found to play important roles in many parts of the economy—for rela-
tionship lending between banks and firms see Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995); for traders in
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Madagascar see Fafchamps and Minten (1999); for the New York apparel market see Uzzi (1997),
for food supply chains see Murdoch, Marsden, and Banks (2000); for the diamond industry see
Bernstein (1992); for Japanese electronics manufacturers see Nishiguchi (1994)—and so on. In-
deed, even in fish markets, a setting where we might expect relationships to play a minor role,
they seem to be important (Kirman and Vriend, 2000; Graddy, 2006). The importance of specific
sourcing relationships in supply networks is also a major concern of the management literature
on supply chains Datta (2017), while Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) find that firms have difficulty
switching suppliers following shocks.
There are many reasons explored in this literature behind the reliance on a small number of
suppliers to source a given input. Technological compatibility and geography can limit the pool
of potential suppliers, while hold-up problems can make trust important and repeated interactions
can help firms to avoid misunderstandings.
The specific relationships that firms maintain for sourcing are imperfect; they are prone to disrup-
tions. While the harm of some disruptions can be mitigated—e.g., through the use of inventories—
this is not always possible, and so disruptions can cause cascading damage. Evidence supporting
both the presence of specific sourcing relationships and their disruptions comes from the presence of
cascades (see, for example, Taschereau-Dumouchel (2020) and Carvalho et al. (2016)). Indeed, the
cascades studied in Taschereau-Dumouchel (2020) provide evidence that dependencies on specific
suppliers do indeed result in contagions of disruption.37
The fundamental source of shocks in our model is the disruption of some particular supply
relationship between two firms. As we discuss below in Section 6.3.4, the basic forces are robust to
exactly how the shock is modeled—whether shocks hit links in the supply network or firms (nodes).
This is intuitive. If a node fails, then that sourcing option is lost just as it is when a link to the
node fails.
Some qualitative descriptions of cascades of disruption due to idiosyncratic shocks can be found
in the business literature. A fire at a Philips Semiconductor plant in March 2000 halted production,
preventing Ericsson from sourcing critical inputs, causing its production to also stop (The Econo-
mist , 2006). Ericsson is estimated to have lost hundreds of millions of dollars in sales as a result,
and it subsequently exited the mobile phone business (Norrman and Jansson, 2004). In another
example, two strikes at General Motors parts plants in 1998 led 100 other parts plants, and then
26 assembly plants, to shut down, reducing GM’s earnings by $2.83 billion (Snyder et al., 2016).
Though these examples are particularly well-documented, disruptions are a more frequent occur-
rence than might be expected. In a survey of studies on this subject in operations and management,
Snyder et al. (2016) write, “It is tempting to think of supply chain disruptions as rare events. How-
ever, although a given type of disruption (earthquake, fire, strike) may occur very infrequently, the
large number of possible disruption causes, coupled with the vast scale of modern supply chains,
makes the likelihood that some disruption will strike a given supply chain in a given year quite
high.” An industry study found 1,069 supply chain disruption events globally during a six-month
period in 2018 (Supply Chain Quarterly, 2018). In the model, a given supply chain is operating
37This paper provides a theoretical account of cascades and then calibrates it to the data. While the focus is
on the failure of specific firms, there is a close connection between systemic implications. In both our paper and
Taschereau-Dumouchel (2020), there are correlations in the functioning of firms near each other in the production
network.
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with some probability, which can be interpreted as some fraction of the time. Thus, as in reality,
disruption events are frequent.
6.1.2. Non-contractible investments in relationships. In this section we argue that the relationships
just discussed are built through decentralized investment by firms in an environment of incomplete
contracting.
Investments in supply relationships are often “soft” in nature and not easily observed. They
include practices such as better understanding a supplier’s or customer’s capabilities by visiting
their facilities, querying odd instructions to catch mistakes, building social relationships that span
the organizations, and so on.38 These types of activities have all been documented by ethnographic
studies in sociology—a prominent one being Uzzi (1997), who offers a detailed account of the
systematic efforts and investments made by New York garment manufacturers and their suppliers
to maintain good relations.
The evidence of disruptions presented in the previous section shows the potential for damaging
sourcing disruptions and helps explain why investments are made. Hendricks and Singhal (2003,
2005a,b) examine hundreds of supply chain problems reported in the business press. Even mi-
nor disruptions are associated with significant and long-lasting declines in sales growth and stock
returns.
Investments in relationships can be hard to systematically observe. However, an extreme form
of such an investment is readily observable—vertical integration. As we discuss in Section 6.2, con-
sistent with our model, Boehm and Oberfield (2020) find evidence of increased vertical integration
when courts are less effective at enforcing formal contracts.39 This behavior suggests the impor-
tance of detailed maintenance of supply relationships and the limits of arm’s-length relationships
in this regard.
6.1.3. Multiple essential inputs. The need to source multiple inputs via specific sourcing relation-
ships gives rise to strong complementarities in production in our model. A large literature has
examined the importance of such complementarities. Kremer (1993) was an influential theoretical
account of the importance of complementarities. This paper and subsequent work argued that
complementarities can help provide a unified account of many economic phenomena. These include
very large cross-country differences in production technology and aggregate productivity; rapid
output increases during periods of industrialization; and the structure of production networks and
international trade flows; see, among many others, Ciccone (2002), Acemoglu, Antra`s, and Helpman
(2007), Levchenko (2007), Jones (2011) and Levine (2012).40
While this evidence is all consistent with our model, it is only suggestive of complexity; alternative
models also deliver consistent complementarities. However, Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) find direct
evidence for firms needing to source multiple inputs via specific supply relationships. They show
that if a supplier is hit by natural disasters it severely disrupts the production of their customers
and also negatively impacts their customers’ other suppliers. If production were not complex,
38Such features are also key to models such as Antra`s (2005) and Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi (2020).
39See also Boehm and Sonntag (2019).
40Prior to his literature, Jovanovic (1987) examines how strategic interdependencies or complementarities can produce
aggregate volatility in endogenous variables despite only seemingly “diversifiable” idiosyncratic volatility in exogenous
variables.
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Figure 6. (A) The probability of successful production of a simple good (m = 1 distinct inputs
needed) as relationship strength varies. (B) The probability, Rx(r), that a focal firm is functional
as a function of r, the probability that a random supplier is functional. This plot is for n = 3 with
x ∈ {0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5, 0.65}. The plot parallels Figure 4, which depicts the same function for the
complex production (m > 1) case.
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Figure 7. The probability of successful production for a firm as market-based sourcing attempts
become more likely to succeed.
then these other suppliers would be providing substitute inputs and hence would benefit from the
disruption to a competitor rather than being adversely affected.
6.1.4. Contrasts with benchmark models without the essential features. In this section, we briefly
consider three types of benchmark models that highlight the necessity of the key features discussed
in the previous section.
Contrast I: Sourcing for simple production. To emphasize that it is essential that multiple
inputs are sourced through relationships, we consider a benchmark model where each firm requires
only a single relationship-sourced input (m = 1, n = 2). We call such production simple because
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each firm requires only one type of risky input relationship to work.41 We plot how the probability
of successful production varies with relationship strength in Figure 6. In comparison to the case
of complex production illustrated in Figure 3(b), there is a stark difference. For values of x < 0.5
the probability of successful production is 0 and for values of x > 0.5 the probability of successful
production is strictly positive, but the change about this point is continuous.
The change at x = 0.5 is abrupt with the derivative changing discontinuously. The intuition
for this change is one that is familiar from the networks literature and in particular from studies
of contagion (see, for example, Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) in the context of financial
contagion). For a given producer, production will be successful if the supply network doesn’t die
out after a finite number of steps. This depends on whether the rate at which new branches in
the network are created is higher or lower than the rate at which existing branches die out due to
failure. It turns out that when x > 0.5, a supply tree grows without bound in expectation, while
when x < 0.5 it dies out.42 The kink in the probability of successful production around the key
threshold of 0.5 is related to the emergence of a giant component in an Erdo¨s–Re´nyi random graph.
That is not the case, as we have seen, for complex production. That is a different sort of phase
transition, reliant on the need for multiple inputs at each stage. As we’ll see, this difference has
stark economic implications once investments in reliability are endogenous.
Contrast II: More complete contracts. The incompleteness of contracts and the decentralized
nature of investments (modeled as a Nash equilibrium) is at the heart of our model. With fully
complete multilateral contracts, efficient investments could be supported as an outcome. This
would imply the absence of fragility in equilibrium, by our results on the planner’s problem (recall
Proposition 2). There is a parallel between our assumptions here and those made in the financial
networks literature (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015)): perfect contracts
could facilitate the efficient management of all systemic risk, but some incompleteness seems realistic
because, in both cases, it is difficult to contract on all investments relevant to robustness.
It is natural to then ask whether various other kinds of agreements—without going all the way to
complete multilateral contracts—could help. It is immediate that if coalitional commitments among
all firms upstream of each supplier were possible that all externalities could be internalized and
hence inefficiency could be eliminated. In practice the coalitions making these commitments would
have to be quite large. An interesting question is whether large coalitions are necessary, or whether
sufficiently good bilateral contracts could work well. In a different but related environment for
studying supply networks, Bimpikis, Fearing, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2018) find that bilateral contracts
are insufficient to eliminate contracting frictions, even when investments are observable. Relatedly,
41As a matter of interpretation, there may be more than one physical input at each stage. The key assumption is
that all but one are sourced as commodities rather than through relationships, and so are not subject to disruption
via shocks to these relationships.
42Given that each producer has two potential suppliers for the input, and each of these branches is operational with
probability x, the expected number of successful relationships a given firm in this supply network has is 2x. When
x < 1/2, each firm links to on average less than 1 supplier, and so the rate at which branches in the supply tree fail
is faster than the rate at which new branches are created. The probability that a path in the supply network reaches
beyond a given tier l then goes to 0 as l gets large and production fails with probability 1. On the other hand, when
x > 1/2, the average number of suppliers each firm has an operating relationship with is greater than 1 and so new
branches appear in the supply tree at a faster rate than they die out, leading production to be successful with strictly
positive probability.
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the financial networks literature has made precise the sense in which bilateral contracts with realistic
limitations are insufficient to restore efficiency.43 In Section 6.3.1 below we also show that if a firm
could voluntarily monitor those upstream of it, or invest in them, we would not expect efficiency
to be restored.
Contrast III: Market-based sourcing. In this benchmark, each firm sources all its inputs
through markets, rather than requiring pre-established relationships. The market is populated
by those potential suppliers that are able to successfully produce the required input. However,
upon approaching a supplier there is still a chance that sourcing fails for one reason or another.
(A shipment might be lost or defective, or a misunderstanding could lead the wrong part to be
supplied.) In the metaphor we introduced earlier, we now assume each firm extends relationships
only to functional suppliers, but we still keep the randomness in whether these relationships work.44
Let the probability a given attempt at sourcing an input succeeds be x, independently. As
before, in view of this idiosyncratic risk, each firm if multisources by contracting with two potential
suppliers of each input. The probability that both potential suppliers of a given input type fail to
provide the required input is (1−x)2, and the probability that at least one succeeds is 1− (1−x)2.
As the firm needs access to all its required inputs to be able to produce, and it requires two different
input types, the probability the firm is able to produce is (1− (1− x)2)2. In Figure 7 we plot how
the probability that a given firm is able to produce varies with the probability their individual
sourcing attempts are successful. This probability increases smoothly as x increases.
This benchmark shows that perfect spot markets remove the discontinuities in our main analysis.
On the other hand, our findings are robust to the existence of imperfect substitutes for specifically
sourced inputs—see Section 6.3.4.
6.2. Short-run and medium-run predictions. In this section we discuss our model in terms
of its short-run and medium-run predictions, and present congruent evidence from the existing
literature. We define the short run to be period of time over which firms are unable to adjust their
relationship strengths. Evidence from Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) suggests that this is on the
order of magnitude of several quarters.45 We define the medium run as a period of time over which
adjustments in relationship strength are possible.46 A variety of research has examined both the
implications of shocks in the short run and the endogenous adjustments that firms undertake in
response to shocks.
Blanchard and Kremer (1997) is an examination of the aggregate consequences of a shock to
institutional quality. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the institutions in place for a planned
economy were lost and market-based institutions had not been built up to adequately take their
place. The short run implications of such a shock in our model is that supply networks in the fragile
regime suffer severe disruption, while depending on the size of the shock, other supply networks
43See Section 4.2 of Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2013).
44Formally, in the construction of the random graph, we allow each firm’s potential supply links to be formed
conditional on the realization of its supplier’s functionality; in particular, these links are extended only to functional
suppliers.
45See their Figure IV.
46In this discussion we hold fixed the production technology, particularly its complexity. These are dimensions that
might change in the long run. For a brief discussion of changes on this time horizon see Section 8.2 below.
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might also suffer severe disruptions. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) argue that this type of shock
can explain the large drop in aggregate output that occurred.47
The calibration in Acemoglu and Azar (2020)48 and the findings of Di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2012) and Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Mejean (2018) are also consistent with substantial dis-
ruptions to production arising from relatively small shocks. Such analyses are often motivated by
theories of granularity (Gabaix, 2011), where idiosyncratic shocks have aggregate impacts. The
empirical studies assess, for instance, shocks in one country on output in another country. Our
analysis provides two complementary approaches to interpreting such effects. First, within the het-
erogeneous supply network version of our model discussed in Section 6.3.5, a disruption to supply
relationships in one country can activate (via a “weakest link” property) a cascade of disruptions
elsewhere. Even if there are is no specific sourcing across countries, a shock in one first country
can cause—via market prices, or other forces—a reduction in the productivity of distant supply
networks, making them fragile. That can then lead to a fairly severe drop, at least temporarily,
in the reliability and hence productivity of the distant supply networks. Fleshing out these points
requires developing our theory to accommodate interactions across different supply networks via
markets, which we discuss in Section 8.3.49
In the medium run, investments in reliability can adjust in response to changes in productivity
or institutional quality. By Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, improvements in institutional quality or
productivity increase the strength of relationships and equilibrium reliability. In the fragile regime,
the impact of any improvement in κ is almost entirely incident on equilibrium reliability. Relatedly,
reductions in institutional quality (lower x¯) induce an almost one-for-one increase in investment, so
that relationship strength is close to constant. These comparative statics predictions are congruent
with evidence on institutional quality and investments in specific supply relationships. Comparing
Indian states with better and worse court system, Boehm and Oberfield (2020) find that firms facing
worse court systems respond in a way that can be interpreted as an extreme form of investing in
their supply relationships—vertically integrating. Also consistent with this, Johnson, McMillan,
and Woodruff (2002) provide survey evidence that reduced trust in courts makes firms that rely on
relationship-specific inputs less likely to switch suppliers. This is suggestive of stronger relationships
endogenously being used to compensate for poor institutions.
In our model, given the same reliability of relationships and the same multisourcing possibilities,
more complex supply networks will be less reliable. Thus while one supply network might be in
the non-fragile regime, a more complex supply network can be in the fragile regime for the same
parameter values. This is consistent with evidence from Boehm (2015) that weak institutions have
a bigger impact when hold-up problems are more severe (as they are for us when production is
more complex). A similar prediction of our model is that when there are fewer multisourcing
opportunities, so that production networks are sparser, then, all else equal, production will be less
47Their explanation is focused on distinctive features of the state-run economy, including single-sourcing. In contrast,
we focus on economies with well developed market-based institutions. We show that such economies can endogenously
arrange themselves in a way that makes them, too, extremely sensitive to institutional shocks. Instead of single-
sourcing playing a key role in fragility, the interaction between endogenous multisourcing and complex production is
what matters for the fragility of our decentralized market economy.
48See their Section 4 and Appendix D.
49Of course, in reality, both truly granular effects stemming from shocks to large firms as well as the amplification of
disruptions that we discuss are likely to be relevant. We do not take any stand on the right decomposition of these
effects.
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reliable. Herskovic (2018) argues, in an asset pricing framework, that this should imply a premium
on the equity values of firms embedded in sparser production networks, and finds evidence of this.
There is one final feature of our model that is worth remarking on. Following a shock to relation-
ship strengths, a collapse in production occurs in the short run, i.e., holding relationship strengths
at their old values. In the medium run (i.e., the time scale on which investments are adjustable),
firms will frequently be able to select new investment levels that allow the supply network to resume
being productive. Our equilibrium selection is optimistic: it focuses on the outcome where, in re-
covering from the shock, firms coordinate on the most productive investment equilibrium, and thus
limit the losses. We could, however, work with less optimistic assumptions. It is consistent once
production has become disrupted for all firms to stop investing altogether. If such coordination
problems occur, disruptions can be longer lasting and consistent with severe productivity damage
following a shock. Evidence from Taschereau-Dumouchel (2020) and Acemoglu and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2020) both suggest that adjustments on the extensive margin are important.
6.3. Nonessential features and extensions.
6.3.1. Investment only in own relationships. It is instructive to consider ways in which the actions
available to firms might be expanded to improve reliability, and whether these could help overcome
the contracting frictions in our setup. Suppose we allowed each firm to invest in any supply
relationship (e.g., between their suppliers and their suppliers’ suppliers). Each relationship is
a public good for all those downstream in the supply network. Improvements in its reliability
will strictly increase the probability that every such firm is functional and hence improve their
profitability. So every such firm has an incentive to invest in it. But allowing them to invest in it
does not solve the problem. In equilibrium, following the logic of Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986), typically only one firm will invest in each relationship. Each firm will be willing to invest up
to the point that the marginal return of the investment equals the marginal benefits. However, the
marginal benefits are heterogeneous and it will only be possible for this condition to be satisfied by
the firm that has the highest marginal benefit of investing. In our model, in equilibrium, the natural
investor is the firm which relies directly on the supply relationship. Modeling firms as investing
only in their direct relationships is a convenient simplification but, for the reasons just described,
is unlikely to change the analysis markedly to a model with more investment opportunities.
6.3.2. Investment only on the intensive margin of relationships. Our modeling of investments in
supply relationships is compatible with multiple interpretations. The first interpretation is that
the set of possible suppliers is fixed, and the investment works on the intensive margin to improve
the quality of these relationships (e.g., by reducing misunderstandings and so on). The second
interpretation is that the investment works on the extensive margin—i.e., firms work to find a
supplier willing and able to supply a given required input type, but their success is stochastic. In
this interpretation there is a fixed set of n potential suppliers capable of supplying the required
input to be found, and each one of them is found independently with probability xif .
50 Conditional
on a supplier being found, the relationship is operational. In Appendix F we discuss a richer
50This search technology is similar to ball-and-urn models of search, and is compatible with a matching function
exhibiting constant returns to scale (see, for example, Hall (1979)).
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extensive-margin interpretation, and also one that permits separate efforts to be directed to the
extensive and intensive margins simultaneously.
6.3.3. Fixed entry decisions. Our model takes the varieties in the market as given, and does not
include entry decisions by firms. This is done to keep the model simple. However, the key insights
carry over in a model with entry.
Consider an extended model where there is an entry stage preceding all others. At this stage, a
firm (i, f) pays a sunk entry cost Φ(f), where Φ is a strictly increasing function. Then the measure
of varieties in each product is set equal to the measure of entering firms (i.e., each entering firm
produces one variety), and the “investment game” where firms choose their relationship strengths
proceeds as we described earlier. A (nontrivial) symmetric equilibrium is now one where f > 0
firms enter in each product and the expected post-entry profits of the marginal firm are equal to
its entry cost.
The main observation is that this model also features an open set of κ parameters where equi-
librium production is on the precipice. The basic logic is as follows. When the supply network is
reliable and gross profits after entry are high, firms want to enter. As they enter, competition drives
down gross profits and makes it less appealing to pay costs to make relationships strong. Recalling
Figure 5, the key to the argument is that increasing entry moves the best-response curve leftward
for a given κ. So, in equilibrium, relationships get weaker. The question is where this dynamic
stops. The precipice is a natural stopping point. Once the investment level is xcrit, reliability can
adjust down until further entry is deterred, while investment remains the same. To show why this
is a generic (i.e., not knife-edge) situation, consider a small increase in κ. This makes entry more
appealing enticing new firms to enter until the marginal firm is again indifferent.
Going beyond this, it can be shown that under suitable conditions in this richer model, an
analogue of Theorem 1 holds, with an ordering of regimes. We do not pursue this extension here.
6.3.4. Details of how disruptions are modeled. We assume zero-one failures: a firm can produce
as long as it has an operational link to at least one functioning producer of each input. More
realistically, it may be that to produce, a sufficient quantity or quality of each input is needed, and
the shock is to whether the requisite level is reached. The shock need not destroy all the output,
but may destroy or reduce the value of the output by some amount (say, a random fraction of
the output). We consider the starkest case for simplicity; the key force is robust to these sorts of
extensions.
The fundamental source of shocks in our model is at the level of links in the supply network.
One could also consider shocks directly hitting firms—i.e., shocks to nodes in our supply network
rather than links. The key conclusions regarding precipices are robust to adding this source of
shocks, or even making node-level shocks the main source of disruptions. We focus on shocks to
relationships for simplicity, but the mathematical forces we identify also operate in alternative
models of disruption.
Finally, we assume that the small shock to x is unanticipated. It is straightforward to use
our analysis to see that this is not essential. Suppose now all firms anticipate that a shock to
x will happen with some probability pshock, and suppose κ is in an open subset of the critical
productivities, so that a collapse would have occurred in the baseline model. When we write the
profit function for firms in the extended model, there will now be an expectation over the shock’s
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arrival, and this will change profits and the best-response correspondence. However, for a small
enough probability of the shock, this change will be small, and the best-response curve in a plot
such as Figure 5(c) will move only slightly. Thus the equilibrium will still be on the precipice if it
was before. Indeed, for κ not too close to the boundary of the critical productivities, the probability
of the shock can be quite substantial without changing the main prediction. The key intuition is
that the precipice is driven by externalities, and while all firms may like to invest more to avoid a
shock, this effect may not be large enough to overcome the underinvestment that leads to fragility.
6.3.5. Heterogeneities. One might suspect that the regularity of the network structure, or some
other kind of homogeneity, plays an important role in generating the sharp transition in the prob-
ability of successful production. In contrast with the key roles played by complexity and specific
sourcing, homogeneities are not important to our main points. The sharp transition we have docu-
mented persists in the presence of heterogeneous networks where different products require different
numbers of inputs, there are different numbers of suppliers for each input and relationship strengths
vary by input. Indeed, paralleling the analysis of the homogeneous case, we show in Section SA2.3
of the Supplementary Appendix, that the reliability of the supply network as a function of link
strength exhibits a sharp transition, even in the presence of such heterogeneities (Proposition SA1).
We suppose here for ease of exposition that the reliability curve is given by the limit correspondence
at τ = ∞, with the understanding that results for the high-τ limit can then be treated from this
(fictitious) limit economy as in our other analysis.
In the current section, we now consider an heterogeneous analogue of the model presented so far,
with firms investing in the strength of their relationships with their suppliers.
We show that supply networks in the presence of heterogeneities feature a weakest link property
(Proposition 4): When the production of one product is fragile, this makes the production of all
products that rely directly or indirectly on it fragile as well.51
We now formalize the different kinds of heterogeneities that we introduce. (1) The set of inputs
of product i, Ii, is an arbitrary set with some cardinality mi. Thus, the input requirements no
longer need to be homogeneous. (2) For each product i and input product j ∈ Ii, there is a number
nij of potential suppliers of product j that each firm has; thus nij replaces the single multisourcing
parameter n. (3) Investment and link strength are input-specific: For a firm if and an input j ∈ Ii,
there is a relationship strength xif,j which replaces the single number xif . The cost of effort is
cij(xif,j − xij). (4) The gross profit conditional on producing product i is Gi(ri). Here Gi is a
product-specific function (which can capture many different features of different product markets
that affect their profitabilities) and ri is the reliability of producers of product i.
For this section, we use x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, ..., x∗|I|) to describe equilibrium investment profiles for the
different products. Note that x∗i = {x∗i,j}j∈Ii is a vector describing the heterogeneous equilibrium
efforts invested by a producer of product i in its relationships with firms supplying different inputs
j ∈ Ii, whereas elsewhere in this article it is a scalar. As before we identify the profile with
the relationship strength achieved. We also let x−i = (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, ..., x|I|) denote the
investment profiles of producers of products other than product i. An investment profile xi is
critical if, fixing the relationship strengths of the producers of other products x−i, the probability
51Thus, as in Bimpikis, Ehsani, and Ilkılıc¸ (2019b) the social planner has different gains from intervening in different
parts of the network.
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of successful production of product i would be zero at any profile x̂i < xi, where x̂i < xi means
that each entry of x̂i is weakly lower than the corresponding entry of xi and at least one such entry
is strictly lower. Product i is critical in an equilibrium when the equilibrium investment profile of
producers of product i is critical.
Proposition 4 (Weakest link property). Denote by cij(xij − xij) = γij c˜ij(xij − xij) the cost for a
firm producing product i of investing in a relationship with a supplier of product j. Here γij > 0
is a scaling factor and c˜ij is a cost function satisfying the same assumptions as before.
(i) Suppose product i is critical. Then any other product j on a directed path from j to i
(on the product interdependencies graph) will fail following a shock  > 0 to γik (which
increases γik to γik + ) for any k ∈ Ii.
(ii) Let ISC ⊂ I be a set of products that are part of a strongly connected component of the
product interdependencies graph. Then any equilibrium with positive effort is such that
either all producers of products i ∈ ISC have critical relationship strengths or no producers
of products i ∈ ISC have critical relationship strengths.
Proposition 4 shows that supply networks suffer from a weakest link phenomenon. First, if a
product is critical, then a shock to it causes the production of other products that use it as an
input, directly or indirectly, to also fail. Second, if we take a strongly connected component of
products where none of them are critical and, say, reduce gross margin Gi for the producers of one
product until it becomes critical, then all products in that component will also become critical at
the same time. The component is only as strong as its weakest link.
In Sections SA2.1 and SA2.2 of the Supplementary Appendix, we further illustrate those sub-
tleties through numerical examples (Examples SA1 and SA2).
7. Related literature
We have already discussed many papers that are most relevant for motivating our assumptions or
interpreting our results above, in Section 6. In this section we review several high-level connections
to related literatures.
There is a vibrant literature in macroeconomics on production networks. This literature dates
back to investigations of the input-output structure of economies and the implications of this (Leon-
tief, 1936). Carvalho (2014) provides a comprehensive survey. Two recent developments in the lit-
erature are particularly relevant to our work: (i) the modeling of the endogenous determination of
the input-output structure; and (ii) a firm-level approach as opposed to considering inter-industry
linkages at a more aggregated level. Some of the most relevant work on these issues includes Ata-
lay, Hortacsu, Roberts, and Syverson (2011), Oberfield (2012), Carvalho and Voigtla¨nder (2014),
Acemoglu and Azar (2020), Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017), Boehm and Oberfield (2020), Tintel-
not, Kikkawa, Mogstad, and Dhyne (2018), and Ko¨nig, Levchenko, Rogers, and Zilibotti (2019).
Baqaee and Farhi (2019) and Baqaee and Farhi (2017) focus specifically on the implications of non-
linearities, and discuss how nonlinearities in firms’ production functions propagate and aggregate
up. Whereas they focus on smooth nonlinearities, we show that especially extreme nonlinearities—
discontinuities—naturally come from complex supply networks. Endogenous firm entry and its
interaction with markups plays an important role in our analysis—see, e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano
30 MATTHEW ELLIOTT, BENJAMIN GOLUB, AND MATTHEW V. LEDUC
(2008). We discuss below how our explicit modeling of sourcing failures at the micro level gives
rise to new effects.
There has been considerable recent interest in markets with non-anonymous trade mediated by
relationships.52 The work most closely related to ours in this area also studies network formation
in the presence of shocks. This includes work in the context of production (e.g., Fafchamps (2002),
Levine (2012), Brummitt, Huremovic´, Pin, Bonds, and Vega-Redondo (2017), Bimpikis, Candogan,
and Ehsani (2019a), Yang, Scoglio, and Gruenbacher (2019), Amelkin and Vohra (2019)), work on
financial networks (e.g., Cabrales, Gottardi, and Vega-Redondo (2017), Elliott, Hazell, and Georg
(2018), Erol (2018), Erol and Vohra (2018), Jackson and Pernoud (2019)), and work in varied
other contexts (e.g., Blume, Easley, Kleinberg, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2011), Jackson, Rodriguez-
Barraquer, and Tan (2012), Talama`s and Vohra (2018)). More broadly, the aggregate implications
of non-anonymous trade have been studied across a variety of settings. For work on thin financial
markets see, for example, Rostek and Weretka (2015), for buyer-seller networks see, e.g., Kranton
and Minehart (2001), and for intermediation see, e.g., Gale and Kariv (2009). Our work focuses
on network formation for production and emphasizes the distinctive network formation concerns
that arise due to strong complementarities. At a methodological level, we offer an approach that
may be useful more broadly. Agents make a continuous choice that determines the probability
of their supply relationships operating successfully. The links that form may, however, fail in a
“discrete” (i.e., non-marginal) way. The first feature makes the model tractable, while the second
one yields discontinuities in the aggregate production function and distinguishes the predictions
from models where the aggregate production function is differentiable. It might be thought that
aggregating over many supply chains, these discontinuities would be smoothed out at the level of
the macroeconomy; we show they are not.
At a technical level, our work is related to a recent applied mathematics literature on so-called
multilayer networks and their phase transitions (Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, and Havlin,
2010). Discontinuities such as the one we study are termed first-order phase transitions in this
literature.53 Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, and Havlin (2010), and subsequent papers in this
area such as Tang, Jing, He, and Stanley (2016) and Yang, Scoglio, and Gruenbacher (2019), study
quite different network processes, typically with exogenous networks. We show that discontinuities
of this kind arise in canonical models of equilibria in production networks, once specific sourcing
relationships are taken into account. More importantly, we endogenize investments in the probabil-
ities of disruption (which are taken to be exogenous in this literature) and elucidate a new economic
force endogenously putting equilibria on a precipice. Predating the recent literature on multilayer
networks, Scheinkman and Woodford (1994) used insights from physics models on self-organized
criticality to provide a “sandpile” model of the macroeconomy in which idiosyncratic shocks have
large aggregate effects.54 The setup and behavior of the model are rather different from ours: the
main point of commonality is in the concern with endogenous fragility. In our work, the supply
52A literature in sociology emphasizes the importance of business relationships, see for example Granovetter (1973)
and Granovetter (1985). For a survey of related work in economics see Goyal (2017).
53These can be contrasted with second-order phase transitions such as the emergence of a giant component in a
communication network, which have been more familiar in economics—see Jackson (2008).
54Endogenously, inventories reach a state analogous to a sandpile with a critical slope, where any additional shock
(grain dropped on the sandpile) has a positive probability of leading to an avalanche.
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network is robust to idiosyncratic shocks but very sensitive to arbitrarily small aggregate shocks to
relationship strength.
8. Concluding discussions
We conclude by sketching some implications of the modeling and analysis. Though we have
focused on descriptive analysis of fragility, we note some basic welfare implications of the model,
Next, we briefly mention some potential applications of the precipice phenomena in analyzing
industrial development as institutions improve. Finally, we analyze how our modeling can play a
role in the analysis of aggregate volatility.
8.1. Welfare implications. In Section 4.1 we showed that a planner will never choose investments
that result in the supply network being fragile. On the other hand, in Section 5 we found that
decentralized investment choices often result in fragile supply networks. In this section we first
discuss the externalities that create this wedge between decentralized outcomes and the planner’s
solution. We then show that there is systematic underinvestment in reliability at fragile equilibria.
Finally, we briefly comment on possible policy remedies.
There are three externalities present when a firm chooses its reliability. First, there is the non-
appropriability of consumer surplus. Consumers value variety and this is not fully internalized in a
firm’s reliability choice. Second, there are reliability spillovers. The reliability of a firm’s interme-
diate good production increases the reliability, and hence profitability, of those firms sourcing from
it, the firms sourcing from these firms, and so on. Both the non-appopriability of consumer surplus,
and the reliability spillover lead to underinvestment in reliability all else equal. On the other hand,
there is also a business stealing effect. Producers of a good make fewer sales when more producers
of the same good are functional. This leads to overinvestment in reliability all else equal.
In a fragile equilibrium any reduction in reliability at a fragile outcome results in production fail-
ing for sure. This unambiguously makes households worse off. Hence there is never overinvestment
in reliability in a fragile equilibrium. We also know from Section 4.1 that reliability investments
are never efficient in a fragile equilibrium. Hence there must be underinvestment in reliability
in all fragile equilibria. This makes sense. The marginal improvement in reliability from a uni-
form increase in investments is infinite—indeed, this is how we concluded that the planner would
never chooses reliability that leads to a fragile supply network. So, in a fragile equilibrium, the
non-appropriability of consumer surplus and reliability spillovers together dominate the business
stealing effect leading to underinvestment.
Underinvestment leading to a fragile equilibrium can be counteracted in various ways, although
fragility will remains a robust phenomena. Suppose, for example, effort is subsidized to increase
robustness, for example making the cost of a given investment 1 − θ times its original cost. More
precisely, we make the gross (i.e., after-entry) profit equal to
Πif = E[Fif ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
prob. functional
κg(r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gross profit
− (1− θ)c(yif )︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of effort
.
Suppose the status quo was a critical equilibrium with reliability r = r (see Figure 5(B) for an
illustration). A subsidy of this form will shift the red best response curve in figure 5(B) to the right.
At the margin this will increase reliability, but have a very limit effect on equilibrium investments
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Figure 8. A contrast of the m = 1 and m = 2 cases with the degree of multisourcing being held at
n = 2. Expected revenues are on the vertical axis. This is a product of the probability of successful
production and price of goods. The case in which the complex good retails for a price of 1 while
the simple good retails for a price of 1/4 is illustrated.
for high values of τ . Thus the equilibrium will remain fragile. In view of this, the same argument
can be used for increasing θ. A similar analysis applies for other interventions that shift the best
response curve to the right. This includes, for example, improvements in institutions.55
8.2. Some simple implications for industrial development. The comparison between the
production of complex and simple products developed in Section 6.1.4 has interesting implications
for the complexity of technologies used across countries, and for industrial development. While
a full analysis of this is beyond the scope of this paper, Figure 8 illustrates the main point—if
complex products are more valuable, small increases in quality of commercial institutions can make
more complex production technologies viable and yield discontinuous benefits.
Even this very rudimentary theory of development and industrialization fits a number of stylized
facts: (i) Industrialization, when it occurs, is rapid and economic output increases dramatically; (ii)
At the same time the share of the value of total production that can be attributed to intermediate
inputs increases quickly (Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin, 1986); (iii) The quality of institutions,
and particularly those related to contracting, can help explain what kinds of production different
economies can support (Nunn, 2007) and hence cross-country differences in development (Acemoglu
and Johnson, 2005), wages and productivities (Jones, 2011); (iv) More complex supply chains are
associated with higher rates of disruption (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and Handfield,
2007).
8.3. Aggregate volatility. So far we have focused on a single complex supply network with
particular parameters. The larger economy can be thought of as consisting of many such supply
55This analysis assumes, as we have throughout, that entry is fixed. If it is not fixed, endogenous adjustments on
this margin can undo the effectiveness of such policies.
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networks, each one small relative to the economy. We study whether the forces making some of
these small supply networks fragile can lead to fragility in the aggregate for such an economy.
Suppose there are many supply networks operating independently of each other, with heterogene-
ity across supply networks but, for simplicity, homogeneity within each network. The parameters
of these different supply networks, including their complexities m and multisourcing numbers n are
drawn from a distribution. We know from the above that a small shock to relationship strength
can discontinuously reduce the production of some of these supply networks. We now point out
that a small shock can have a large macroeconomic effect, and that previous results on the fragile
regime, especially Proposition 6, are essential to this.
For simplicity, fix the function c(·).56 A given supply network is then described by a tuple
s = (m,n, κ). We consider the space of these networks induced by letting the parameters m,n
and κ vary. In particular, we let M be the set of possible values of m, the set of integers between
1 and M ; we let N be the set of possible values of n, integers between 1 and N , and we allow
κ ∈ K = [0,K]. The space of possible supply networks is now S = M×N × K. We let Ψ be a
distribution over this space, and assume that it has full support.
In some supply networks there will not exist a positive equilibrium (for example, when κ is
sufficiently low fixing the other parameters). Consider now those supply networks for which there
is a positive equilibrium. There are two possibilities. It may be that the only supply networks for
which there is a positive equilibrium have m = 1.57 That is, the only supply networks with positive
reliability are simple. In this case, there is no aggregate fragility.
But if, in contrast, S contains supply networks where production is not simple, then we will have
macroeconomic fragility. Indeed, an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that if there are some
complex (m ≥ 2) supply networks with positive equilibria, then some of the lower-κ networks with
the same (n,m)—which are included in S—are in the fragile regime. The measure that Ψ assigns
to supply networks in the fragile regime is positive. Thus, a shock to relationship strengths will
cause a discontinuous drop in expected aggregate output.
In this setting of multiple supply networks with heterogeneous primitives, one might hope that
aggregate shocks have a silver lining: a “housecleaning” or “forestfire” effect. If some supply net-
works are fragile, then even a small aggregate shock will cause them to collapse, but the remaining
supply networks will be robust to further shocks. Unfortunately this optimistic conclusion need
not hold.
So far we have looked at the case in which the different supply networks operate independently
and all business-to-business transactions occur through supply relationships confined to their re-
spective supply networks. We think of these relationships as mediating the supply of inputs that
are tailored to the specifications of the business purchasing them. They are not products that can
be purchased off-the-shelf. However, many other inputs are sourced in different ways. For example,
most business use computers, and buy them off-the-shelf rather than through relationships subject
to disruption. So far we have abstracted from any interdependencies between businesses created by
such purchases. However, these interdependencies might matter. If a small aggregate shock causes
the collapse of some supply networks, the inputs available to other supply networks that managed
56This could also be drawn from a distribution, but the notation would be more cumbersome.
57For example, it might be that M = 1 so that only simple production is feasible, or K might be sufficiently low that
only simple production has a positive probability of being successful.
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to remain functional become scarcer and more costly. This effectively damages the productivity of
these other supply networks, and when they reoptimize, some of them that were not previously on
a precipice will now find themselves there. Thus, they will be sensitive to further aggregate shocks.
The key is that being on the precipice is not a fixed attribute of a supply network’s structure, but
in fact dependent on its productivity. Thus, even with market-mediated spillovers, the productiv-
ity damage of collapses leads to domino effects where, iteratively, previously robust parts of the
economy become fragile.58
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Appendix A. Formal construction of the supply network
We now formalize some details concerning the model in Sections 2.2 and 2.1.
We describe the supply Endow each Vi with the Borel σ-algebra. A supply network with param-
eters m, n, µ is a random graph G = (V, E) satisfying the following properties.
• Its nodes are the set V.
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• In the next several bullets we specify the edges of those v ∈ V with d(v) > 0. Edges are
ordered pairs (v, v′) where v′ = (j, ω′) for j ∈ I(i)—the meaning is that v can potentially
source from v′, and we depict such an edge as an arrow from v to v′.
• For each j ∈ I(i) there are n edges (v, v′) to n distinct varieties v′ of product j, i.e. elements
of Vj . For any variety, define its neighborhood Nv = {v′ : (v, v′) ∈ E}.
• For any variety v, the elements of Nv ∩ Fj are independently drawn from an atomless
distribution over Vj conditioned on d(v′) = d(v)−1, and these realizations are independent.
• For any countable set of varieties V ′, neighborhoods Nif are independent.
Define G′+ to be a random subgraph59 of G in which each edge is kept independently, with
probability x. More formally, define for every edge e a random variable Oe ∈ {0, 1} (whether the
edge is operational) such that
• P[Oe = 1 | G] = x for every e ∈ G and,
• for any countable subset E of edges in G, the random variables (Oe)e∈E are independent
conditional on G.
A subset V̂ ⊆ V is defined to be consistent if, for each v ∈ V̂ with d(v) > 0 the following holds:
for each product j that v = (i, ω) requires as inputs (∀ j ∈ I(i)), there is an operational edge
(v, v′) ∈ G′+) with v′ ∈ V̂. There may be many consistent sets, but by Tarki’s theorem, there will
be a maximal one, V, which is a superset of any other consistent set. For any given variety, this
can be found by the simple iterative procedure in Section 3.1.
Since any countable set of edges is independent, we can make computations about the relevant
marginal probabilities in our model (e.g., reliability of any variety) as we would if there only one
tree. The formal construction above allows us to extend this to a continuum economy.
Appendix B. Details and proofs for microfoundations of production
We begin with some basic observations about equilibrium and then turn to proving Lemma 1.
Throughout this analysis, we take ρ = ρ(x, µ) as a given parameter, let N = |I|, and normalize the
wage to 1. The first welfare theorem holds and equilibrium production is efficient—i.e., maximizes
the quantity C subject to physical constraints.
We take labor to be the numeraire.
We start by showing that all firms produce the same quantity of goods for consumption.
Lemma 3. The selling prices of the intermediate goods of all varieties within an industry are equal.
Proof. Intermediates are sold at the marginal cost of the inputs required to produce them. By
constant returns to scale, the price of each variety’s intermediate good, pv, is a strictly increasing
function of the prices of each of firm v’s inputs and does not depend on the quantity firm v produces.
We establish the conclusion of the lemma by induction on the depth of the variety v. If d(v) = 0,
firm v = (i, ω) can source from any firm in each industry j ∈ I(i) and can thus minimize its
marginal costs. It is easy to deduce from this that pv = minω∈[0,1] p(i,ω). Now take a variety v of
depth d(v) = d; by definition v sources its intermediate goods from firms with depth d− 1 in each
industry j. These produce at minimal cost so it follows that pv = minω∈[0,1] p(i,ω). This gives us
that all firms in the same industry have the same marginal costs and thus the same intermediate
prices. 
Lemma 4. All firms produce the same quantity of goods for consumption.
Proof. From the previous lemma, let all firms in industry i sell intermediate goods at price pi. By
constant returns to scale, pi is not a function of the quantity produced and is only a function of
the prices of the intermediates pj where j ∈ I(i). Let P be a function that expresses an industry’s
59The subscript + refers to the positive-depth varieties: the entire graph G′ of supply relationships is obtained by
setting the out-neighborhood of the depth-0 to be
⋃
j∈I(i) Vj , since they can source from anyone.
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intermediate price in terms of its input industries’ intermediate prices and let Mi be a m × N
matrix such that for each row r, the entry Mr,k = 0 for all k but one which we label ji(r). This
index satisfies ji(r) ∈ I(i); Mr,ji(r) = 1; and Mr′,ji(r) = 0 for r′ 6= r. Then, for all industries i,
pi = P(Mip)
We have that P is increasing in each input as an increase in input prices will increase the price of
the good. Additionally,
P(αMip) < αP(Mip) if α > 1
This is true because if all input prices (including the wage) are scaled, then the price of the good
would be scaled by the same factor. But because the wage is fixed, the effect of this scaling is
smaller.
Now assume, for the sake of contradiction, that not all prices are the same. Without loss of
generality, let pa = max(p1, ..., pN ) and pb = min(p1, ..., pN ) with
pa
pb
= r > 1. Because the prices of
the inputs of industry a must be at least pa and the prices of the inputs of industry b must be at
most pb, each element of Map must be less than or equal to each element of rMbp. Now,
pa = P(Map) ≤ P(rMbp) < rP(Mbp) = rpb = pa
This is a contradiction. Thus, all industries must sell intermediate goods at the same price. 
We now turn to the proof of Lemma 1 and normalize κ = 1. Note that because labor is the only
unproduced input, the price of an intermediate good is equal to the total amount of labor used to
produce a unit of it (its total factor content), which, in equilibrium, we denote L∗i (recall labor is
the numeraire). Thus, all firms sell at some universal price p = L∗i . Because p does not depend on
the reliability r, we can write this amount q∗ and equilibrium consumption as follows:
1 =
N∑
i=1
prq∗, which implies q∗ =
1
pNr
C =
(
N∑
i=1
rq∗
)1/ηC
=
r1/ηC−1
pN
(6)
We have that each firm produces 1pNr and sells at a price marked up 1/ηC over marginal cost and
thus earns gross profit (
1
ηC
− 1
)
1
Nr
(7)
Because 0 < ηC < 1, we have that consumption increases as r increases and profits decrease as r
increases.
B.1. A lemma on symmetric undominated equilibria. This subsection uses our results above
to establish that the symmetric equilibrium maximizing social surplus is the one with greatest
relationship strengths x and highest reliability.
Recall our notation that consumption is C = κh(r) and gross profits are κg(r). The above
calculations show we may write
h(r) =
r1/ηC−1
pN
and g(r) =
(
1
ηC
− 1
)
1
Nr
.
Lemma 5. Suppose ηC ∈ (12 , 1) and we have two symmetric equilibria with relationship strengths
x1 < x2 and reliabilities r1 < r2. Then C(r2)−c(x2) > C(r1)−c(x1). That is, the higher-investment
equilibrium maximizes net social surplus.
Proof. Suppose one firm slightly increases its xif . The effects on social surplus can be divided into
four parts:
(1) marginal investment costs incurred by if : c′(xif )dxif (a negative contribution);
40 MATTHEW ELLIOTT, BENJAMIN GOLUB, AND MATTHEW V. LEDUC
(2) marginal producer surplus received by if ;
(3) marginal producer surplus received by firms other than if , which is negative;
(4) marginal consumer surplus.
By the Nash equilibrium condition, the effects (1) and (2) cancel: the sum of these contributions is
zero. By the formula for g(r), (3) is zero to first order. The contribution (4) is clearly positive from
the formula for h(r) above. Now integrate across all firms f to obtain the effect of a small increase
in all x (noting that second-order terms cancel). Our reasoning above implies a strict increase in
social surplus.
Note that for x ≥ xcrit, we have that C(ρ(x, µ)) is concave and increasing in x while c(x) is
convex, so
C(ρ(x, µ))− c(x)
is single-peaked. The above argument implies both equilibria are socially inefficient, and thus social
surplus is increasing in x at both of them. This combined with single-peakedness shows that the
one with higher relationship strength is more efficient. 
Appendix C. Omitted proofs and analysis for main results
C.1. The reliability curve in the deep network limit. In this section we define and charac-
terize the reliability function in the limit as τ →∞.
Definition 3. Let ρ : [0, 1] ⇒ [0, 1] be a correspondence such that
(i) for any r ∈ ρ(x), there is a sequence {xτ}∞τ=1 → x such that limτ→∞ ρ(xτ , µτ ) = r.
(ii) for any sequence {xτ}∞τ=1 → x the limit limτ→∞ ρ(xτ , µτ ) ∈ ρ(x).
Proposition 5 (Shape of the reliability correspondence). Let the complexity of production be
m ≥ 2 and the number of potential suppliers for each input be n ≥ 2, then ρ(x) is uniquely defined
and has the following properties. There exists an xcrit ∈ (0, 1) such that
(i) ρ(x) is single valued for all x 6= xcrit
(ii) ρ(x) = 0 for all x < xcrit
(iii) there is a value 0 < rcrit < 1 such that ρ(xcrit) = [0, rcrit].
(iv) ρ(x) is strictly increasing in x for all x > xcrit.
(v) limx↓xcrit ρ
′(x) =∞.
C.1.1. Proof of Proposition 5. In order to prove Proposition 5 it is helpful to define and characterize
a new function ρ̂(x). It will turn out that for all x 6= xcrit, ρ(x) = ρ̂(x). We define ρ̂(x) as the
largest fixed point of the following equation
r̂(x) = (1− (1− xr̂(x))n)m. (8)
Lemma 6,which is proved in Section SA3.1 of the Supplementary Appendix, identifies several
key properties of ρ̂(x).
Lemma 6. Suppose the complexity of the economy is m ≥ 2 and there are n ≥ 1 potential input
suppliers of each firm. For r ∈ (0, 1] define
χ(r) :=
1−
(
1− r 1m
) 1
n
r
. (9)
Then there are values xcrit, rcrit ∈ (0, 1] such that:
(i) ρ̂(x) = 0 for all x < xcrit;
(ii) ρ̂ has a (unique) point of discontinuity at xcrit;
(iii) ρ̂ is strictly increasing for x ≥ xcrit;
(iv) the inverse of ρ̂ on the domain x ∈ [xcrit, 1], is given by χ on the domain [rcrit, 1], where
rcrit = ρ(xcrit);
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(v) χ is positive and quasiconvex on the domain (0, 1];
(vi) χ′(rcrit) = 0.
We now use Lemma 6 to prove Proposition 5.
First, consider a depth-d tree where each firm in each tier requires m kinds of inputs and has
n potential suppliers of each input. The nodes at the most-upstream tier are functional for sure.
We denote by ρ˜(x, d) the probability of successful production at the most-downstream node of a
depth-d tree with these properties. This is defined as
ρ˜(x, d) = (1− (1− xρ˜(x, d− 1))n)m
with ρ˜(x, 0) = 1, since the most-upstream tier nodes do not need to obtain inputs.
(a) (b)
Figure 9. Panel (A) plots the function χ as r varies, and then in Panel (B) we show how switching
the axes and taking the largest r value on the graph (corresponding to the largest solution of
equation (PC)) generates ρ̂(x).
Figure 9(a) depicts χ as a function of r. Since by definition the largest r satisfying (PC) (Eq.
(8)) is the one that determines reliability ρ̂(x), it follows that the increasing part of the function,
where r ∈ [rcrit, 1] is the part relevant for determining equilibrium reliability—see Figure 9(b),
where the light gray branch is not part of ρ̂.
A first observation is that ρ˜(x, d) and its derivative converge uniformly to the function ρ̂(x)
everywhere except near xcrit.
Lemma 7.
(1) For all d ≥ 1, the function x 7→ ρ˜(x, d) defined for x ∈ (0, 1) is strictly increasing and
infinitely differentiable.
(2) On any compact set excluding xcrit, the sequence (ρ˜(x, d))
∞
d=1 converges uniformly to ρ̂(x)
and (ρ˜′(x, d))∞d=1 converges uniformly to ρ̂
′(x).
Proof. The sequence (ρ˜(·, d))∞d=1 is a sequence of monotonically increasing60 and differentiable func-
tions, converging pointwise to ρ̂. We know that ρ̂ is continuous and has finite derivative on any
compact set excluding xcrit. Therefore, by Dini’s theorem, the functions ρ˜(·, d) converge uniformly
to ρ̂; the analogous statement holds with derivatives. 
Now we will show that ρ(x, µτ ) → ρ̂(x) for any x 6= xcrit. Points (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) of
Proposition 5 are then corollaries of Lemma 6.
First note that {ρ˜(·, d)}∞d=1 is a sequence of monotonically increasing and differentiable functions,
converging pointwise to ρ̂(·).
60From Eq. (3), it is clear that increasing x increases ρ˜(x, d).
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As an intermediate step, also note that for any η > 0, d > 0 there exists τ such that for τ > τ ,
|µτ (0) +
∑
d≤d
µτ (d)
(
[1− (1− xρ˜(x, d− 1))n]m − ρ̂(x))| = |µτ (0) +∑
d≤d
µτ (d)
(
ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x))|
< η.
Indeed, as τ increases, the probability mass placed on lower d’s becomes negligible (and thus
µτ (0) +
∑
d≤d µτ (d) becomes negligible).
Thus, for any τ > τ ,
|ρ(x, µτ )− ρ̂(x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣µτ (0) +∑
d
µτ (d)ρ˜(x, d)−
(
µτ (0) +
∑
d
µτ (d)
)
ρ̂(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣µτ (0)− µτ (0)ρ̂(x) +
∑
d≤d
µτ (d) [ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x)] +
∑
d>d
µτ (d) [ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
<
∣∣∣∣∣∣µτ (0) +
∑
d≤d
µτ (d) [ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x)] +
∑
d>d
µτ (d) [ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
<
∣∣∣∣∣∣µτ (0) +
∑
d≤d
µτ (d) [ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
d>d
µτ (d) [ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
< η +
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
d>d
µτ (d)
(
ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
and since ρ˜(x, d) converges pointwise to ρ̂(x) for any x, then we can say that, for any η′ > 0, there
exists τ such that |∑d>d µτ (d)(ρ˜(x, d)− ρ̂(x))| < η′ and thus that ∣∣ρ(x, µτ )− ρ̂(x)∣∣ < η + η′ = .
Thus, for any  > 0 there exists τ such that for τ > τ , we have |ρ(x, µτ ) − ρ̂(x)| < . In other
words, ρ(x, µτ ) converges pointwise to ρ̂(x) for any x 6= xcrit. Therefore, ρ(x) takes the form of
the continuous function ρ̂(x) for x 6= xcrit and we have that |ρ(x, µτ ) − ρ(x)| <  for those values
of x. It follows that for any sequence {xτ}∞τ=1 → x 6= xcrit, limτ→∞ ρ(xτ , µτ ) = ρ(x) (Part (ii) of
Definition 3). Since ρ(x) is single valued for x 6= xcrit, Part (i) of Definition 3 follows trivially.
Using Lemma 6, we have thus shown points (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) of Proposition 5.
Now we analyze the case x = xcrit:
For any r ∈ [0, rcrit], we can construct a sequence {xτ}∞τ=1 → xcrit such that limτ→∞ ρ(xτ , µτ ) =
r. To see this, simply note that for any r ∈ (0, rcrit] and any τ , there is an xτ such that ρ(xτ , µτ ) = r
since ρ(x, µτ ) is a continuous and increasing function
61 of x whose image is [0, 1]. In the case of
r = 0, there exists a sequence {xτ}∞τ=1 → xcrit such that ρ(xτ , µτ ) ↓ 0 since for any x < xcrit,
ρ(x, µτ ) ↓ 0. Moreover, since for any x < xcrit, limτ→∞ ρ(x, µτ ) = 0 and for any x > xcrit there
exists  > 0 such that limτ→∞ ρ(x, µτ ) = rcrit + , and since ρ(x, µτ ) is continuous and increasing
in x, we know that (i) for every value of r ∈ [0, rcrit] there exists a sequence {xτ}∞τ=1 → xcrit such
that limτ→∞ ρ(xτ , µτ ) = r (Part (i) of Definition 3); and (ii) every sequence {xτ}∞τ=1 → xcrit will
be such that limτ→∞ ρ(xτ , µτ ) ∈ [0, rcrit] (Part (ii) of Definition 3). We have thus shown that at
x = xcrit we must have ρ(xcrit) = [0, rcrit], establishing part (iii) of Proposition 5.
C.2. Proof of Lemma 2 (Sufficient condition for unique interior maximum of firm’s
problem). We first study the objects in the limit as τ →∞. We will later establish convergence
of the finite objects to that limit so that the properties still hold for large τ .
We establish some notation. Recall that
61Indeed, it is a weighted sum of continuous and monotonically increasing functions ρ˜(x, d).
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Figure 10. The shape of Q(xif , x).
P (xif ;x) = (1− (1− xifρ(x))n)m.
For the extended domain xif ∈ [0, 1/ρ(x)], we define
Q(xik;x) :=
∂
∂xif
P (xif ;x). (10)
and it can be expressed as Q(xik;x) = mn(1− (1− xifρ(x))n)m−1(1− xifρ(x))n−1ρ(x).
We will need two steps to prove Lemma 2. The first step consists of establishing Lemma 8 on
the basic shape of Q(xif ;x).
Lemma 8. Fix any m ≥ 2, n ≥ 2, and x ≥ xcrit (here setting ρ(xcrit) = rcrit). There are uniquely
determined real numbers x1, x2 (depending on m,n, and x) such 0 ≤ x1 < x2 < 1/ρ(x) and so that:
0. Q(0;x) = Q(1/ρ(x);x) = 0 and Q(xif ;x) > 0 for all xif ∈ (0, 1/ρ(x));
1. Q(xif ;x) is increasing and convex in xif on the interval [0, x1];
2. Q(xif ;x) is increasing and concave in xif on the interval (x1, x2];
3. Q(xif ;x) is decreasing in xif on the interval (x2, 1].
4. x1 < xcrit.
The proof of Lemma 8 is in Section SA3.2 of the Supplementary Appendix. Figure 10 illustrates
the shape of Q(xif , x) implied by Lemma 8.
We now complete the proof of Lemma 2 by setting x̂ = x1. By Lemma 8 property 4, the interval
(x̂, xcrit) is non-empty. Thus we just need show to that Assumption 2 is satisfied when x ∈ (x̂, xcrit).
Note that by Assumption 1 c′(0) is 0 and increasing and weakly convex otherwise. Since, by Lemma
8, P ′(xif ;x) is first concave and increasing (possibly for the empty interval) and then decreasing
(possibly for the empty interval) over the range xif ∈ [x, 1], it follows that there is at most a single
crossing point between the curves P ′(xif ;x) and c′(xif − x). This crossing point corresponds to
the first-order condition62 P ′(xif ;x) − c′(xif − x), yielding the unique maximizer of Π(xif ;x), as
illustrated in Fig. 11. If such a crossing does not exist, yif = 0 is a local and global maximizer of
the profit function.
Now we study the quantities introduced above, but for finite a τ and show that when τ is large
enough, we still obtain a unique single crossing.
62We can also scale the term P ′(xif ;x) by a multiplying factor G, but this will not affect the properties discussed
before and thus the uniqueness of the crossing.
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Figure 11. P ′(xif ;x) is in blue and c′(xif − x) is in red. There can be only one crossing point
between the two curves, which corresponds to the maximizer of Π(xif ;x).
Note that P (xif ;x, µτ ) = µτ (0) +
∑
d µτ (d)(1 − (1 − xif ρ˜(x, d − 1))n)m, while Q(xif ;x, µτ ) =
P ′(xif ;x, µτ ) =
∑
d µτ (d)mn(1 − (1 − xif ρ˜(x, d − 1))n)m−1(1 − xif ρ˜(x, d − 1))n−1ρ˜(x, d − 1) and,
taking G = 1 for simplicity of exposure, Π(xif ;x, µτ ) = P (xif ;x, µτ ) − c(xif − x). These are
continuous functions of ρ˜(x, d). Recall that for all x 6= xcrit, ρ˜(x, d) →d ρ(x) (and ρ(x, µτ ) →τ
ρ(x)). It then follows that P (xif ;x, µτ )→τ P (xif ;x) since limτ→∞
∑
d>d µτ (d) = 1 for any d (and
limτ→∞ µτ (0) = 0). It also follows that Q(xif ;x, µτ ) →τ Q(xif ;x) for the same reason. We then
immediately have that Π(xif ;x, µτ ) →τ Π(xif ;x). We can then conclude that for τ large enough,
there will also be at most a single crossing between the curves Q(xif ;x, µτ ) and c
′(xif − x) and
thus the results stated in the limit also hold for τ large enough.
C.3. Proof of Proposition 1 (Discontinuity in reliability). Part (i):
The fact that ρ(x, µτ ) → 0 for x < xcrit follows from Definition 3 and Proposition 5(ii). From
Lemma 1, C∗(x, µτ ) = κh(ρ(x, µτ )) with h an increasing and continuous function with h(0) = 0.
It then follows that C∗(x, µτ )→ 0.
Part (ii): From proposition 5(iii) and (iv), it follows that ρ(x) > rcrit for any x > xcrit and thus,
for τ large enough, ρ(x, µτ ) > rcrit > 0. It then follows that C
∗(x, µτ ) = κh(ρ(x, µτ )) > κh(rcrit) =
C > 0 (from which it follows that C∗(x, µτ ) ≥ C > 0).
C.4. Proof of Proposition 2 (Social planner’s solution). Recall that xSP (κ, µτ ) is the set of
all values of x maximizing the planner’s objective.
By Proposition 1(i), xcrit > 0, and for all x < xcrit, we have C
∗(x) = limτ→∞C∗(x, µτ ) = 0.
Thus no value of x ∈ (0, xcrit) can be a solution to the social planner’s problem in the limit. Further,
we show in the proof of Proposition 5 that ρ(x, µτ ) converges pointwise to ρ(x). Thus by Lemma
1 consumption also converges pointwise to its limit value and for all τ sufficient large there can be
no solution to the social planner’s problem with 0 < x < xcrit.
Further, for all values of κ sufficiently small, and for all values of x ∈ [0, 1],
c(xcrit) > κ ≥ κρ(x, µτ ).
Thus for sufficiently small values of κ the unique solution to the social planner’s problem is xSP (κ) =
{0}.
45
Next note that for all values of κ sufficiently large,
c(xcrit) < κrcrit,
and the social planner strictly prefers choosing x = xcrit to x = 0. Thus, when κ is sufficiently high
all values in xSP (κ) will be weakly greater than xcrit.
Define κcrit(µτ ) := supκ:0∈xSP (κ,µτ ) κ. As the social planner’s unique solution is x = 0 for values
of κ sufficiently low, and x = 0 is not a solution for values of κ sufficiently high, κcrit(µτ ) is a finite,
strictly positive number. This establishes part (i).
We now show that 1 6∈ xSP (κ, µτ ) for all values of κ and τ . As κ is bounded, limx→1 1κc′(x) =∞
by our assumption that c′(x) =∞. Moreover, as n ≥ 2, we have that xcrit < 1, so ρ′(x) is bounded
for values of x near 1. Thus, by the chain rule and Lemma 1, C∗′(x) is also bounded. Hence, at
x = 1 the social planner can always do a little better by reducing investment.
Thus for values of κ > κcrit(µτ ) all solutions to the social planner’s problem must be interior and
so the following first-order condition must hold:
κh′(ρ(x, µτ ))ρ′(x, µτ ) = c′(x).
By Lemma 6, part (vi), limx↓xcrit limτ→∞ ρ
′(x, µτ ) =∞. As by assumption c′(x) is bounded for inte-
rior values of x, and as h is an increasing function there cannot be an interior equilibrium in the limit
as τ gets large at x = xcrit. This implies that in the limit as τ gets large all solutions to the social
planner’s problem for κ > κcrit are at values of x strictly greater than xcrit. As ρ
′(x, µτ ) converges
to ρ′(x) pointwise, for all τ sufficiently large we then have limx↓xcrit κh
′(ρ(x, µτ ))ρ′(x, µτ ) > c′(x)
establishing part (ii). Furthermore, as limx↓xcrit κh
′(ρ(x, µτ ))ρ′(x, µτ ) > c′(x), for all τ sufficiently
large, there cannot be a solution to the social planner’s problem at x = xcrit for κ = κcrit—the
social planner could always do better by increasing x a little. This establishes part (iii).
C.5. Proof of Proposition 6 (Unique symmetric undominated equilibrium).
Proposition 6. Fix any n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3, and any κ and g consistent with the maintained
assumptions. There exists  > 0 such that the equation MB(χ(r); r, κ) = MC(χ(r)) has at most
one solution r∗ in the range [rcrit − , 1]. Here χ(r) =
1−
(
1−r 1m
) 1
n
r is defined as in Lemma 6.
In the following argument, we defer technical steps to lemmas, which are proved in the Supple-
mentary Appendix.
We begin by sketching the idea of the argument. The following definitions will be helpful.
MB(xif ; r, κ) = κg(r)
∂P (xif ; r)
∂xif
(11)
MC(xif ) = c
′(xif − x) (12)
We first want to show that there is a range [rcrit− , 1], for which there is at most one solution to
MB(x; r, κ) = MC(x) (OI) and x = χ(r) (PC) simultaneously. Consider any positive symmetric
equilibrium x with reliability r = ρ(x). Recall that physical consistency in the limit τ →∞ entails
r = ( 1 − ( 1 − x r )n︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability a given input cannot be acquired
)m. (PC)
By Lemma 6(i), if x < xcrit, then r = 0 and marginal benefits from investing are 0, an impos-
sibility by the optimal investment condition. Therefore, x ≥ xcrit and so by Lemma 6(iv) we have
x = χ(r). (See see Panel (a) of Figure 12.)
Now, given Assumption 2, the optimal investment condition OI says that we have
MB(x; r, κ) = MC(x),
where
MB(xif ; r, κ) = κg(r)rn(1− xr)n−1m(1− (1− xr)n)m−1 (13)
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and MC(x) = c′(x− x). Since we recently deduced x = χ(r), we can substitute out x to find that
the following equation holds:
MB(χ(r); r, κ) = MC(χ(r)).
(a) (b)
Figure 12. Panel (a) shows the relationship between r and x implied by physical consistency.
Panel (b) plots the function b(r) discussed in the proof.
We can now define two auxiliary functions of r:
b(r) = MB(χ(r); r, κ)
c(r) = MC(χ(r))
so that we can simply study the equation
b(r) = c(r). (14)
More explicitly,
κg(r)mnr2−
1
m
(
1− r1/m
)1− 1
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(r)
= c′
( 1− (1− r 1m − x) 1n
r︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
)
(15)
We wish to show that there is a range [rcrit − , 1] for which there is at most one solution to
equation (14).63 The right-hand side of the equation is increasing in r for r ∈ [rcrit, 1].64 If we
could establish that the left-hand side, which we call b(r), is decreasing in r, it would follow that
there is at most a unique r solving (15) for r ∈ [rcrit, 1]. Thus, by the continuity of b(r) and c(r),
it would follow immediately that for some small  > 0, there is also at most a single solution over
the range [rcrit − , 1]. Unfortunately, b(r) is not decreasing in r. However, we can show that it
is decreasing in r for r ≥ rcrit, which is sufficient.65 Panel (b) of Figure 12 gives a representative
depiction of b(r), reflecting that it is decreasing to the right of r˜ < rcrit.
63We note that the functions on both sides of the equation are merely constructs for the proof. In particular, when
we sign their derivatives, these derivatives do not have an obvious economic meaning.
64This follows directly: χ is increasing on that domain and c′ is increasing by assumption. (see Panel (a) of Figure
12).
65We do this by showing that the global maximum of b(r) is achieved at a number r˜ that we can prove is smaller
than rcrit.
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By plugging in x = χ(r) into (13), we have
b(r) = κg(r)mnr2−
1
m
(
1− r 1m
)1− 1
n
. (16)
The following Lemma completes the proof.
Lemma 9. b is strictly decreasing on the domain [rcrit, 1).
To prove lemma 9 we write b(r) as a product of two pieces, α(r) := κg(r) and
β(r) := mnr2−
1
m
(
1− r 1m
)1− 1
n
.
Note that the function β(r) is positive for r ∈ (0, 1). We will show that it is also strictly decreasing
on [rcrit, 1). By assumption, g(r) is positive and strictly decreasing in its argument, so α(r) is also
positive and decreasing in r. Thus, because b is the product of two positive, strictly decreasing
functions on [rcrit, 1), it is also strictly decreasing on [rcrit, 1). It remains only to establish that β(r)
is strictly decreasing on the relevant domain. Two additional lemmas are helpful.
Lemma 10. The function β(r) is quasiconcave and has a maximum at r̂ :=
(
(2m−1)n
2mn−1
)m
.
Lemma 11. For all n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3, we have that r̂ < rcrit.
Lemmas 10 and 11 are proved in Sections SA3.3 and SA3.4 of the Supplementary Appendix.
Together these show that β(r) is strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing in r for r ∈ (0, 1),
with a turning point in the interval (0, rcrit). Thus β(r) is strictly decreasing on the domain [rcrit, 1),
the final piece required to prove Lemma 9.
Thus, by the continuity of b(r) and c(r), it follows immediately that there exists  > 0 such that
there is at most a single solution for r ∈ [rcrit − , 1].
C.6. Proof of Theorem 1 (Classification of regimes as κ varies).
Proof. Recall the optimal investment (OI) condition:
MB(x; r, κ) = MC(x). (17)
Denote by BR(r, κ) = {x : MB(x; r, κ) = MC(x)} the set of effort levels such that OI is satisfied
at a given r. Let BR(r, κ) = max{x : x ∈ BR(r, κ)} be the maximal element of the set BR(r, κ).
Note however that by Lemma 2 and Assumption 2, the best response is unique for r ≥ rcrit and
thus BR(r, κ) contains a single element for r ≥ rcrit.
First note that if κ′ > κ, then BR(r, κ′) > BR(r, κ). This is evident from condition OI, since
the left-hand side of Equation (17) is increasing in κ whereas the right-hand side is constant (does
not depend on κ).
Lemma 12. (i) BR(0, κ) = 0 and (ii) for all κ such that there exists r solving MB(χ(r); r, κ) =
MC(χ(r)), there exists  > 0 such that BR(r, κ) is strictly decreasing in r on the domain [rcrit−, 1].
Proof of Lemma 12. We know that MB(x; 0, κ) = 0 when r = 0 (see Eq. (13)) and thus, from
equation OI, the only best response is x = 0. Thus BR(0, κ) = BR(0, κ) = 0.
We know from Proposition 6 that there is  > 0 such that there can be at most one solution r∗
to MB(χ(r); r, κ) = MC(χ(r)) over the range [rcrit − , 1]. This corresponds to a point such that
both MB(x; r, κ) = MC(x) and x = χ(r) are satisfied. It follows that BR(r, κ) can intersect the
curve x = χ(r) at only one point on that interval [rcrit − , 1] (see Fig. 13). This occurs when κ is
high enough (else there cannot be a solution to MB(x; r, κ) = MC(x) since the marginal benefits
are simply lower than the marginal cost for any investment level). If BR(r, κ) were not strictly
decreasing in r on that interval [rcrit − , 1], there could be more than one intersection between
BR(r, κ) and x = χ(r), which would contradict Proposition 6. To see this, suppose there is a
r̂ > rcrit −  such that BR(r, κ) has a positive slope on [rcrit − , r̂) and then a negative slope on
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Figure 13. The curves BR(r, κ) and x = χ(r) represented on the same graph for some large
enough value of κ. For such a large enough value of κ, the curve BR(r, κ) is strictly decreasing in
r over a range [r˜, 1] with some r˜ < rcrit. It this were not the case, there would be a smaller value
of κ for which there would be two crossings of the curves over the range [r˜, 1], thus contradicting
Proposition 6.
(r̂, 1]. Then, since BR(r, κ) is increasing in κ, there would be a κ′ such that BR(r, κ′) is tangent
to x = χ(r) and a κ′′ > κ′ such that BR(r, κ′′) intersects x = χ(r) at two points. This yields the
desired contradiction.

Lemma 13. BR(r, κ, µτ ) converges pointwise to BR(r, κ) for any r.
Proof of Lemma 13. BR(r, κ, µτ ) = max{x : MB(x; r, κ, µτ ) = MC(x)} where
MB(x; r, κ, µτ ) = κg(r)mn(1− xr)n−1(1− (1− xr)n)m−1r
∞∑
d=1
µτ (d).
Note that, since µτ puts mass at least 1− 1τ on [τ,∞), it follows that
∑∞
d=1 µτ (d)→ 1 as τ →∞.
It follows that, as τ →∞,
MB(x; r, κ, µτ )→ κg(r)mn(1− xr)n−1(1− (1− xr)n)m−1r = MB(x; r, κ)
and thus that
BR(r, κ, µτ )→ BR(r, κ)
for any r.

Part (i):
In the limit τ →∞, let κ be the smallest κ such that BR(r, κ) ∈ ρ(xcrit). Such a κ exists since
BR(r, κ) is increasing and continuous in κ, ρ(x) is 0 for all x < xcrit and 0 = BR(0, κ) < BR(r, κ)
for some r ∈ (0, 1). Thus, there will be a κ such that BR(r, κ) just touches ρ(x) at xcrit. By the
properties of BR(r, κ) in Lemma 12, any such intersection will be such that r < rcrit since BR(r, κ)
is decreasing in r over a range [rcrit − , 1]. If there are multiple points of intersection, we take the
one with the highest r and we label this r by rcrit.
Since BR(0, κ) = 0, then for any κ < κ, the only intersection between BR(r, κ) and ρ(x) is at
(x, r) = (0, 0).
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Note that for any τ , ∂ρ(x,µτ )∂xif |xif=x=0 = 0 and BR(0, κ) = 0. Now, since we know ρ(x, µτ )
converges to ρ(x) (Proposition 5) and BR(r, κ, µτ ) converges to BR(r, κ) (Lemma 13), it follows
that when κ < κ, then there exists τ such that for τ > τ , the curves BR(r, κ, µτ ) and ρ(x, µτ )
intersect only at a point (x, r) where x = 0 and r = 0.
Part (ii)
Now take any κ ≥ κ. Since BR(r, κ) ≥ BR(r, κ) for any r (with equality holding only when
κ = κ), then it follows that in the limit τ → ∞, there will be at least one point of intersection
between BR(r, κ) and ρ(x). We select the one with the highest reliability r. If κ is close enough to
κ, then this point will be (xcrit, r) with r ∈ (rcrit, rcrit).
Since we know ρ(x, µτ ) converges to ρ(x) and BR(r, κ, µτ ) converges to BR(r, κ), it then follows
that for any  > 0, there exists τ such that for τ > τ , BR(r, κ, µτ ) and ρ(x, µτ ) intersect at some
point x ∈ [xcrit − , xcrit + ] and r ∈ [rcrit − , rcrit + ].
in the limit τ →∞, as κ keeps increasing, BR(r, κ) also increases and thus the point of intersec-
tion with the highest reliability will reach (xcrit, rcrit) when κ reaches some upper value κ. Since
we know ρ(x, µτ ) converges to ρ(x) and BR(r, κ, µτ ) converges to BR(r, κ), by the same argument
as before, it then follows that for any  > 0, there exists τ such that for τ > τ , BR(r, κ, µτ ) and
ρ(x, µτ ) intersect at some point x ∈ [xcrit − , xcrit + ] and r ∈ [rcrit − , rcrit + ].
Part (iii):
Finally, in the limit τ → ∞, as κ > κ, BR(r, κ) keeps increasing and the point of intersection
between BR(r, κ) and ρ(x) with the highest reliability r will run along the part of the ρ(x) curve
for which x > xcrit. At any such point, we also have r > rcrit.
Since ρ(x, µτ ) converges to ρ(x) and BR(r, κ, µτ ) converges to BR(r, κ), this also holds for any
τ large enough. 
C.7. Proof of Corollary 1 (Comparative statics in baseline institutional quality). Equi-
libria are given by the highest intersection of the reliability curve with the best response curve.
The reliability curve is constant as both κ and x change. The conditions for optimal investment
that must be satisfied in the equilibrium x∗′ := x∗(κ′, x) are that
MB(x∗′) =
1
κ′
c′(x∗′ − x).
It needs to be shown that there exists an x′ ∈ (x, x∗′) such that
MB(x∗′) =
1
κ
c′(x∗′ − x′).
Note that c′(x∗′ − x′) is continuous in x′ holding x∗′ fixed, with
1
κ
c′(0) = 0 <
1
κ′
c′(x∗′ − x) = MB(x∗′) and 1
κ
c′(x∗′ − x) > 1
κ′
c′(x∗′ − x) = MB(x∗′).
The result then follows from the intermediate value theorem. 
C.8. Proof of Proposition 3 (Equilibrium fragility). When κ ∈ [κ, κ]:
From Theorem 1, for any  > 0, there exists τ such that for any τ > τ , x∗(µτ ) ∈ [xcrit−, xcrit+].
Thus for a shock of size 2, the relationship strength after the shock is x− + ξ∗(µτ ) ≤ xcrit − .
From Proposition 5, for any η > 0, there exists τ ′ such that for all τ > max{τ , τ ′}, ρ(x −  +
y∗(µτ ), µτ ) < η.
Thus, when κ ∈ [κ, κ] the equilibrium is fragile.
When κ > κ:
From Theorem 1, x∗(µτ ) converges to x∗ > xcrit as τ →∞. Thus, for any  > 0, there may not
exist a τ such that x∗(µτ ) −  = x −  + y∗(µτ ) < xcrit for all τ > τ and from Proposition 5, for
any η, there may not exist a τ ′ such that ρ(x− + y∗(µτ ), µτ ) < η for all τ > max{τ , τ ′}.
Thus, when κ > κ the equilibrium is robust. 
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C.9. Proof of Proposition 4 (Weakest links). Part (i): Let P be a directed path of length
T from node T to node 1 and denote product i by 1. Since product 1 is critical, then following a
shock  > 0 to γij , r
∗′
1 = 0, where the ‘prime’ notation denotes the equilibrium quantity after the
shock.
For any product t+ 1 that sources input t and such that r∗′t = 0, we have that
r∗
′
t+1 =
∏
l∈It+1
(1− (1− x∗t+1,lr∗
′
l )
nt+1,l)
= 0
since t ∈ It+1.
Since r∗′1 = 0, it then follows by induction that the production of all products t ∈ P will fail.
Part (ii): Suppose production of some product i ∈ ISC is critical and consider another product
k ∈ ISC that is an input for the production of product i (that is, k ∈ Ii). As an investment
equilibrium x∗ is being played, the strength xkj of a link from a producer of product k to a supplier
of input j ∈ Ik must satisfy the following condition
MBkj = κg(rk)
∏
l∈Ik,l 6=j
(1− (1− xklrl)nkl)nkj(1− xkjrj)nkj−1rj = γkj c˜′(xkj − xkj) = MCkj
Rearranging this equation yields
κg(r∗k)
γkj
∏
l∈Ik,l 6=j
(1− (1− x∗klr∗l )nkl)nkjr∗j =
c˜′(x∗kj − xkj)
(1− x∗kjr∗j )nkj−1
.
The right hand side is strictly increasing in x∗kj , while the left hand side is constant.
Consider now a shock  > 0 that changes the value of γkj to γ
′
kj = γkj + . This strictly reduces
κg(r∗k)/γkj , and hence the new equilibrium investment level satisfies x
∗′
kj < x
∗
kj . This in turn implies
that r∗′k < r
∗
k, and so
r∗
′
i =
∏
l∈Ii
(1− (1− x∗i,lr∗
′
l )
ni,l) (18)
<
∏
l∈Ii
(1− (1− x∗i,lr∗l )ni,l) (19)
= r∗i (20)
since k ∈ Ii. Thus r∗′i = 0 and the production of product i fails.
Now since both products k and i are part of a strongly connected component, there is also a
directed path from k to i. From part (i), it follows that every product t on such a directed path
(i.e. every product that uses input i either directly or indirectly through intermediate products)
will also have r∗′t = 0. This is true namely for product k and thus r∗
′
k = 0. We therefore conclude
that, following a small decrease in its sourcing effort from the initial x∗k, production of product k
fails. Product k was thus necessarily critical and we must have had x∗k be critical.
Proceeding similarly for any other product e ∈ Ik such that e ∈ ISC , we get that e is also critical.
By induction it follows that all products in a strongly connected component ISC of the product
interdependencies graph are critical when one of them is. We conclude that either production of
all the products in ISC are critical or else production of all the products in ISC are noncritical. 
Appendix D. Interdependent supply networks and cascading failures
We now posit an interdependence among supply networks wherein each firm’s profit depends on
the aggregate level of output in the economy, in addition to the functionality of the suppliers with
whom it has supply relationships. Formally, suppose, κs = Ks(Y ), where Ks is a strictly increasing
function and Y is the integral across all sectors of equilibrium output:
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Y =
∫
S
ρ(x∗s)dΦ(s).
Here we denote by x∗s the unique positive equilibrium in sector s. The output in the sector is the
reliability in that sector, ρ(x∗s).
The interpretation of this is as follows: When a firm depends on a different sector, a specific
supply relationship is not required, so the idiosyncratic failure of a given producer in the different
sector does not matter—a substitute product can be readily purchased via the market. Indeed, it is
precisely when substitute products are not readily available that the supply relationships we model
are important. However, if some sectors experience a sudden drop in output, then other sectors
suffer. They will not be able to purchase inputs, via the market, from these sectors in the same
quantities or at the same prices. For example, if financial markets collapse, then the productivity of
many real businesses that rely on these markets for credit are likely to see their effective productivity
fall. In these situations, dependencies will result in changes to other sectors’ profits even if purchases
are made via the market. Our specification above takes interdependencies to be highly symmetric,
so that only aggregate output matters, but in general these interdependencies would correspond
to the structure of an intersectoral input-output matrix, and K would be a function of sector level
outputs, indexed by the identity of the sourcing sector.
This natural interdependence can have very stark consequences. Consider an economy character-
ized by a distribution Ψ in which the subset of sectors with m ≥ 2 has positive measure, and some
of these have positive equilibria. Suppose that there is a small shock to x. As already argued, this
will directly cause a positive measure of sectors to fail. The failure of the fragile sectors will cause
a reduction in aggregate output. Thus κs = Ks(Y ) will decrease in other sectors discontinuously.
This will take some other sectors out of the robust regime. Note that this occurs due to the other
supply chains failing and not due to the shock itself. As these sectors are no longer robust, they
topple too following an infinitesimal shock to x. Continuing this logic, there will be a domino effect
that propagates the initial shock. This domino effect could die out quickly, but need not. A full
study of such domino effects is well beyond our scope, but the forces in the very simple sketch we
have presented would carry over to more realistic heterogeneous interdependencies.
Fig. 14 shows66 how an economy with 100 interdependent sectors responds to small shocks to x.
In this example, sectors differ only in their initial κ’s. The technological complexity is set to m = 5
and the number of potential suppliers for each firm is set to n = 3. The cost function67 for any
firm if is c(xif − x) = 0.01(1−(xif−x))2 while the gross profit function is g(ρ(x)) = 5(1 − ρ(x)). This
setup yields values κ = 0.963 and κ¯ = 3.585 delimiting the region corresponding to critical (and
therefore fragile) equilibria, as per Theorem 1.
In Fig. 14(a), the productivity shifter of a given sector is distributed uniformly, i.e. κs ∼ U(κ, 25),
so that many sectors have high enough productivity to be in a robust equilibrium while a small
fraction have low enough productivity to be in a fragile equilibrium. A small shock to the x of
all sectors thus causes the failure of the fragile sectors (there are initially 12 of them). This then
decreases the output Y across the whole economy, but only to a small extent (as seen in the right
panel). The resulting decrease in the productivities of the robust sectors is thus only enough to
bring one robust sector into the fragile regime and thus to cause it to fail as well upon a small
shock. In the end, a total of only 13 sectors have failed.
66Note that in this example, the cascade dynamics is as follows: At step 1, firms in sectors with a κ in the fragile
range fail due to an infinitesimal shock to x. The initial economy-wide output Y1 is then decreased to Y2 and the
κ’s are updated using an updating function K(Y ) increasing in Y . Only then, are the firms in the surviving sectors
allowed re-adjust xif . At step 2, infinitesimal shocks hit again and the firms newly found in the fragile regime fail.
This process goes on at each step until no further firm fails, at which point the cascade of failures stops.
67For simplicity, we set x = 0. An infinitesimal shock to x has the effect of causing the firms of sectors in the fragile
regime to fail, but does not affect the value of x, which remains at 0.
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Figure 14. Number of sectors that remain productive (left) and economy-wide output Y (right)
for each step of a cascade of failures among 100 interdependent sectors. For all sectors: n = 3,
m = 5, c(xif − x) = 0.01(1−(xif−x))2 , g(ρ(x)) = 5(1 − ρ(x)). This yields κ = 0.963 and κ¯ = 3.585. In
row (a), 100 sectors have κs initially distributed according to U(κ, 25); In row (b), 100 sectors have
κs initially distributed according to U(κ, 13); In row (c), 100 sectors have κs initially distributed
according to U(κ, 10).
In contrast, Fig. 14(b) shows an economy where κs ∼ U(κ, 13), so that more sectors have low
enough productivity to be in a fragile equilibrium. A small shock to the x of all sectors causes the
failure of the fragile sectors (now initially 24). These have a larger effect on decreasing the output Y
across the whole economy (as seen in the right panel). The resulting decrease in the productivities
of the robust sectors is now enough to bring many of them into the fragile regime and to cause
them to fail upon an infinitesimal shock to x. This initiates a cascade of sector failures, ultimately
resulting in 50 sectors ceasing production.
Fig. 14(c) shows an economy where κs ∼ U(κ, 10), so that even more sectors have low enough
productivity to be in a fragile equilibrium. A small shock to the x of all sectors causes the failure of
the fragile sectors (now initially 26) and this initiates a cascade of sector failures which ultimately
brings down all 100 sectors of the economy.
The discontinuous drops in output caused by fragility, combined with the simple macroeconomic
interdependence that we have outlined, come together to form an amplification channel reminiscent,
e.g., of Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) and Baqaee (2018). Thus, the implications of those
studies apply here: both the cautions regarding the potential severity of knock-on effects, as well
as the importance of preventing first failures before they can cascade.
Appendix E. How production unravels when relationship strength is too low
Figure 3(b) shows that when x drops below xcrit, the mass of firms that can consistently function
falls discontinuously to ρ(x) = 0. While we will typically just work with the fixed point as the
outcome of interest, the transition will not be instantaneous in practice. How then might the
consequences of a shock to x actually play out?
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Figure 15. The dynamics of unraveling (with the same parameters as in Figure 4, as discussed in
Section E.
In Figure 15, we work through a toy illustration to shed some light on the dynamics of collapse.
Using the same parameters as our previous example, suppose relationship strength starts out at
x = 0.8. The higher curve in panel (a) is R(·;x) for this value of x. The reliability of the economy
here is r0, a fixed point of R, which is the mass of functioning firms. Now suppose that a shock
occurs, and all relationships become weaker, operating with the lower probability x = 0.7. The R
curve now shifts, becoming the lower curve.
To consider the dynamics of how production responds, we must specify a few more details. We
sketch one dynamic, and only for the purposes of this subsection. We interpret idiosyncratic link
operation realizations as whether a given relationship works in a given period. Before the shift in x,
a fraction r0 of the firms are functional. Let F˜(0) be the random set of functional firms at the time
of the shock to x. Now x shifts to 0.7; we can view this as a certain fraction of formerly functional
links failing, at random. Then firms begin reacting over a sequence of stages. Let us suppose that
at stage s a firm can source its inputs if it has a functional link to a supplier who was functional in
the last stage, s− 1.68 Let F˜(s) be the set of these functional firms. By the same reasoning as in
the previous subsection, we can see that the mass of F˜(s), which we call rs, is R(rs−1). Iterating
the process leads to more and more firms being unable to produce as their suppliers fail to deliver
essential inputs. After stage 1, the first set of firms that lost access to an essential input run out of
stock and are no longer functional. This creates a new set of firms that cannot access an essential
input, and these firms will be unable to produce at the end of the subsequent stage, and so on.
The mass of each rs can be described via the graphical procedure of Figure 15: take steps between
the R curve and the 45-degree line.
This discussion helps make three related points. First, even though the disappearance of the
positive fixed point—and thus the possibility of a positive mass of consistently functional firms—is
sudden, the implications can play out slowly under natural dynamics.69 The first few steps may
look like a few firms being unable to produce, rather than a sudden and total collapse of output.
68For example, firms might hold inventories that enable them to maintain production for a certain amount of time,
even when unable to source an essential input. Even if firms engage in just-in-time production and do not maintain
inventories of essential inputs, there can be a lag between shipments being sent and arriving.
69Indeed, in a more realistic dynamic, link realizations might be revised asynchronously, in continuous time, and
firms would stop operating at a random time when they can no longer go without the supplier (e.g., when inventory
runs out). Then the dynamics would play out “smoothly,” characterized by differential equations rather than discrete
iteration.
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The second point is more subtle. Suppose that when the dynamic of the previous paragraph
reaches r2, the shock is reversed, x again becomes 0.8, and R again becomes the higher curve.
Then, with some supply links reactivated, some of the firms that were made non-functional as the
supply chain unravelled will become functional again, and this will allow more firms to become
functional, and so on. Such dynamics could take the system back to the r0 fixed point if sufficiently
many firms remain functional at the time the shock is reversed. Thus, our theory predicts that
sufficiently persistent shocks to relationship strength lead to eventual collapses of production, but,
depending on the dynamics, the system may also be able to recover from sufficiently transient
shocks.
The third point builds on the second. Suppose that a shock is anticipated and expected to
be temporary. Then firms may take actions that slow the unravelling to reduce their amount of
downtime. For example, they may build up stockpiles of essential inputs. If all firms behave in this
way, the dynamics can be substantially slowed down and the possibility of recovery will improve.
Having illustrated some of the basic forces and timing involved in unraveling, we do not pursue
here a more complete study of the dynamics of transient shocks, endogenous responses, etc.—an
interesting subject in its own right. Instead, from now on we will focus on the size, ρ(x), of the
consistent functional set, which is the steady-state outcome under a relationship strength x.
Appendix F. Interpretation of investment
F.1. Effort on both the extensive and intensive margins. This section supports the claims
made in Section 6.3.2 that our model is easily extended to allow firms to make separate multi-
sourcing effort choices on the intensive margin (quality of relationships) and the extensive margin
(finding potential suppliers).
Suppose a firm if chooses efforts êif ≥ 0 on the extensive margin and effort e˜if ≥ 0 on the
intensive margin, and suppose that xif = h(êif , e˜if ). Let the cost of investment be a function of
êif + e˜if instead of yif . This firm problem can be broken down into choosing an overall effort
level eif = êif + e˜if and then a share of this effort level allocated to the intensive margin, with
the remaining share allocated to the extensive margin. Fixing an effort level e, a firm will choose
êif ∈ [0, e], with e˜if = e − êif , to maximize xif . Let ê∗if (e) and e˜∗if (e) = e − ê∗if (e) denote the
allocation of effort across the intensive and extensive margins that maximizes xif given overall effort
e. Given these choices, define h∗(e) := h(ê∗if (e), e˜
∗
if (e)). As h
∗ is strictly increasing in e, choosing
e is then equivalent to choosing xif directly, with a cost of effort equal to c(h
∗−1(e)). Thus, as
long as the cost function ĉ(e) := c(h∗−1(e)) continues to satisfy our maintained assumptions on c,
everything goes through unaffected.
F.2. A richer extensive margin model. In the previous subsection we gave an extensive margin
search effort interpretation of xif . In some ways this interpretation was restrictive. Specifically,
it required there to be exactly n suppliers capable for supplying the input and that each such
supplier be found independently with probability xif . This alternative interpretation is a minimal
departure from the intensive margin interpretation, which is why we gave it. However, it is also
possible, through a change of variables, to see that our model encompasses a more general and
standard search interpretation.
Fixing the environment a firms faces, specifically the probability other firms successfully produce
r > 0 and a parameter n that will index the ease of search, suppose we let each firm if choose
directly the probability that, through search, it finds an input of given type. When r = 0 we
suppose that all search is futile and that firms necessarily choose x̂if = 0. Denote the probability
firm if finds a supplier of a given input type by x̂if . Conditional on finding an input, we let it be
successfully sourced with probability 1 so all frictions occur through the search process. Implicitly,
obtaining a probability x̂if requires search effort, and we suppose that cost of achieving probability
x̂if is ĉ(x̂), where ĉ is a strictly increasing function with ĉ(0) = 0.
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We suppose firms choose x̂if taking the environment as given. In particular, firms take as given
the probability that suppliers of the inputs they require successfully produce. When many potential
suppliers of an input produce successfully we let it be relatively easy to find one, and if none of
these suppliers produce successfully then it is impossible to find one. In addition, the parameter n
shifts how easy it is to find a supplier.
Given this set up we can let the probability of finding a supplier have the functional form
x̂ := 1− (1− xifr)n, and the cost of achieving this probability be given by ĉ(x̂) := c
(
1−(1−x̂)1/n
r
)
.
Although these functional form assumptions might seem restrictive, we still have freedom to use
any function c satisfying our maintained assumptions. This degree of freedom is enough for the
model to be quite general as all that matters is the size of the benefits of search effort relative to
its cost, and not the absolute magnitudes. Further, these functional form assumptions satisfy all
the desiderata we set out above. As 1− (1− xifr)n is the key probability throughout our analysis,
all our results then go through with this interpretation.
